


# ARMY


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# ARMY

A PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATION DEVOTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCES AND REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE U.S. ARMY

## Inside: Our Global Frontiers

"Only tyrants seem to have difficulty in comprehending the American mind, and their most famous last words have been, 'The Americans won't fight.'"

**Lt. Gen. MILTON G. BAKER, page 21**

"It is possible for those who do not understand democracy to make a mistake about these matters—by reading a desire for peace as a willingness to yield. This is a mistake Moscow cannot afford."

**Secretary of State DEAN RUSK, page 24**

"We can offset a local preponderance of Communist strength by a determination to apply Western strength on terms other than those selected by the Soviets."

**Assistant Secretary of Defense PAUL H. NITZE, page 27**

"We must eschew the conservative approach. Let us do our planning with the thought in mind that a completely new idea or concept can set the enemy back for years."

**Secretary of the Army ELVIS J. STAHR, JR., page 30**

"The Army has the core of experienced soldiers—both in active service and in the reserve components—around which we can expand."

**Gen. GEORGE H. DECKER, page 38**

"If we do not adequately equip our Army with modern weapons now, we must be prepared some day to accept the responsibility for sending our inadequately armed sons to fight an adversary who will be numerically superior and better armed."

**Lt. Gen. ROBERT W. COLGLAZIER, JR., page 41**

"The man who will spell the difference is the ground combat soldier."

**Gen. BRUCE C. CLARKE, page 47**

"The battle in Asia is primarily a power struggle with the enemy conducting military operations under an ideological frosting."

**Gen. JAMES F. COLLINS, page 53**

THE NATION'S GLOBAL FRONTIERS	21	FRONTIER SOUTH: Latin America	61
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**Editorial Note:** Limited space required your editors to condense all the addresses and presentations which appear in this issue. In each case we have conscientiously attempted to preserve and present the essential core of the speaker's theme and intent. We regret that we found it necessary to eliminate completely several presentations including the one on the Continental Army Command by Maj. Gen. Louis W. Truman, Deputy Chief of Staff of that Command.




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## BUILT TO TAKE PUNISHMENT IN ANY ENVIRONMENT

The broad usefulness of the Boeing Vertol 107, world's only "mission module" helicopter, is augmented by rotor blades designed for dependable service in even the most unfavorable environments. With heat-treated steel D-spar forming the leading edge, Boeing Vertol rotor blades have good fatigue strength and great resistance to surface scratching and nicking. Steel loses little weight due to normal sand and rain erosion, thus Boeing Vertol rotor blades with hundreds of hours difference in service time can be used on the same rotor.

Proved thus far in more than 260,000 hours of accumulated service, the Boeing Vertol steel spar rotor blades have demonstrated excellent performance under difficult conditions in many places. Greenland, Labrador, Alaska, Northern Canada, the Sahara Desert and Far East jungle operation have proved the blades in a broad spectrum of temperature, erosion and corrosion environments. The steel spar rotor blades, incorporating latest state-of-the-art advances, are furnished as standard equipment on the versatile Boeing Vertol 107. They provide all-weather dependability and long life, with interchangeability that simplifies spares provisioning, maintenance and overhaul.




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**URGENT:** **PACK**



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# ARMY

## letters

### A TERRIBLE BURDEN

● The publication of "Countering Guerrilla Attack" in the September issue was a stroke of good fortune for your readers. For the good of the service, a copy of this speech by Dr. Rostow should be sent with the compliments of ARMY to each U. S. civil and military official who has anything to do with our Southeast Asia policy, and particularly those who exercise influence on economic and military aid to South Vietnam.

Dr. Rostow's statements cannot be refuted. Most have been well known by all foreign officials in Vietnam for a number of years, although many, for reasons best known to themselves, ignored or declined to face the facts. The Vietnamese, strongly anti-Communist, have been engaged in war with the Viet Cong guerrilla forces of Communist North Vietnam since at least early 1957. The leaders and the

hard core cadres of these guerrilla bands receive their orders from Hanoi and they alone are responsible for the cold-blooded murders and torturing of village civil officials and the terrorizing of the more isolated countryside, not local dissatisfied rice farmers and fishermen as some would have us believe. The vast majority of the rank and file of these guerrilla bands were press-ganged into service through fear of their lives or the life of a near relative. That defeated guerrilla bands gain sanctuary across the Vietnamese border cannot be denied. There they can rest, lick their wounds, resupply, and make detailed plans for the next raid across the nearby border. As Dr. Rostow says, "guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases—with rights of sanctuary—is a terrible burden to carry for any government."

I'm sure that all officers and men

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who have served with MAAG Vietnam join with me in thanks to ARMY and in hoping that the views expressed in "Countering Guerrilla Attack" will be understood and acted upon in a positive way by those high in our government circles.

LT. GEN. S. T. WILLIAMS  
San Antonio, Tex.

● General Williams was Chief of MAAG Vietnam from November 1955 to August 1960.—THE EDITORS.

### A REGIMENT IS MEN

● The regiment is not dead. It lives in the hearts of old soldiers. While the old ones fade away, the dignity of their regiments takes root in young minds as the prime historic motive of all fighting men.

CAPT. RICHARD J. BUCK  
Fort Campbell, Ky.

### REAR AREA SECURITY

● As a member of the Military Police Corps, I congratulate Major Keith L. Monroe for writing, and you for publishing, the very informative and enlightening "Rear Area Security: A Job for MPs," in the July issue.

Major Monroe's views sum up many dimensions of the MPC which very often are not recognized. As he indicates, rear-area security is more than a job for the combat-ready infantry soldier; it is a job for trained military police. MPs represent a cross-section of combat soldiers and trained policemen. This is substantiated by the accomplishment of the many missions imposed on today's MPC.

LT. CARL J. ALLEN  
Fort Riley, Kans.

● I have just finished the article on rear-area security in July's issue. It hits the nail on the head; a splendid discussion and solution.

Good ideas in ARMY should be made doctrine as soon as possible.

LT. COL. J. T. BARTON  
Indiantown Gap Mil. Res., Pa.

### THE NEED FOR GOOD LEADERS

● If you had published the story on Kirkwood [June] the month after "The Land Battle in Atomic War [July], it would have offered a good example of quality forces and their effect on wars. The Delawares and their commander did not add up to much on paper, but they fought like a much larger outfit. The small scale of their actions makes it plain that with just those few out of the fight, our history might read differently.

Selection of leaders always makes a difference. Some people are the kind who look good from the start; others

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THE TIMES**

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Automatic alternate routing, complete  
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automatic retransmission, and receipting  
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The ITT-025 typifies the comprehensive  
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


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# How to turn a new face into an old hand

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oped and perfected in Hughes plants. Videosonic systems apply proven audio-visual methods in new and highly developed ways. Recorded instructions and slides guide workers step by step. They *see* what they are to do, as they *hear* how to do it. Each work station is integrated into over-all operations—pace is maintained, flow is smoothed.

Videosonic systems also give immediate measurable results in other areas where efficiency is demanded. Clerical workers can quickly learn new methods. Product testing can be speeded. Engineering activities can be made more effective.

Videosonic systems have proven their merit in 5 years of use in Hughes plants in El Segundo and Fullerton, California and Tucson, Arizona. Today, they assure the reliability and speed production of Polaris missiles, electronic armament systems, Falcon missiles, electronic air defense control systems, and advanced computer systems.

*Interested in Videosonic systems for your operation? Hughes has prepared a special booklet detailing the advantages of Videosonic systems. For your copy, please contact: Manager, Videosonic Systems, Hughes Ground Systems Group, Building 381-B, Fullerton, California.*

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## LETTERS

have to be tried under battlefield conditions. Any book on warfare, and especially those about combat units, shows that those outfits that had exceptional leaders always stand out.

Small outfits depend on good leaders, but good leaders have to be found and used. We have many standard tests for sorting out mechanics, linguists, genius types, and plain morons. How can we screen the genuine tigers accurately? Perhaps we might let them land on hostile shores with few men and no support, but that would be too drastic. Here's a test battery we really need.

CWO JOHN P. CONLON  
Newark, Ohio

### CAREER FIELDS IN GEOGRAPHY

● Congratulations to Major Koch on "Of Time and Terrain" in the September issue. Geography, whether it is military, political, economic, or historical, is still geography. The relation of man to land with all its various and sundry meanings, has long been overlooked by the military as well as by many professional people.

The Army could well afford a career field in geography. Many college graduates with degrees in geography would jump at the chance to pursue their chosen field in Army Green. Why doesn't the Department of the Army visit major colleges and universities that have large departments of geography and try to recruit trained geographers? I myself have a degree in geography and have done a year's graduate work in the geopolitical field, but as a junior officer I can find no outlet for my years of study.

LT. ROBERT W. SHOHAN  
Fort Sam Houston, Tex.

### THE MORE IT CHANGES . . .

● As I read through Colonel Storey's article on the new efficiency report [ARMY, August] and the further explanation in DA Pamphlet 355-25 (Officers Call: New Efficiency Reporting System), I am forced by the aptness of the phrase to comment, "The more it changes, the more it's the same thing."

Both articles purport that the new system deals more fairly with the officer in the field, explaining for the first time the mysteries of the efficiency scoring system and its values. Both articles are, I believe, more important for what they fail to say than for the meaning of their wordings.

Much ado is made in both, and in




other releases on the subject, of the eventual demise of the Overall Efficiency Index, composed of seven years' Annual Efficiency Index. Absolute values, computed by the raters, are to replace the relative values of the old system. The end of the OEI is hailed in the DA pamphlet, but only when—get this fine print—"the accumulation of annual ratings under the new system will be sufficient to permit dropping the OEI entirely as a factor in personnel actions." Now, I ask, will these accumulations not also be used as "broad screening devices" for relative comparisons of officers in personnel actions, as was the old OEI? Regardless of the absolutivity of the scoring in the field, and the recording of these exact scores in the Pentagon, are the scores not to be compared relatively? Is it not to be expected that a series of averages will be developed at DA, to facilitate comparisons, screenings and selections?

But enough of these rhetorical questions. If the answers to these be yes (or no as you choose to answer), I hereby offer to wager anyone who cares to accept a new AG uniform, that the actual average scores will, within two years, be considerably higher than the "expected distribution of rated officers" depicted on the form. I, for one, will be reluctant to rate a truly excellent officer Excellent. Most of my associates agree. I do not apologize for this attitude. I neither fear nor favor my subordinates. I am, however, extremely desirous of being fair to them. I am not saying that I distrust my fellow rating officers; I distrust the system. Before you criticize me, consider this poser: What would be the current fate of an excellent officer who had received ratings of Excellent for, say, the last ten years?

As a possible solution to this dilemma (the same which, I believe, condemned prior rating forms), I recommend that the Pentagon annually publish the average numerical scores of officers by grade and branch. This should serve as a means of clearly informing raters of the standards against which they may fairly evaluate their officers. I don't expect that this simple action will solve all the problems of performance evaluation and comparison, but it should help. If some data such as these are not provided, I predict a short life for Form 67-5.

While I am on the soapbox, I'll criticize the decision to keep the re-

(Continued on page 80)



*dependable transportation... come hill*



In 1959 the Army asked Aeronutronic Division of Ford Motor Company to investigate the practicality of air cushion vehicles.

Today Aeronutronic has advanced designs for two such carriers. Both will travel almost anywhere, skimming five feet above the surface, unhampered by the weather or the extremes of climate.

Although planned for different payloads and missions, both are highly maneuverable, simple to operate and easily and quickly serviced. They are specific answers to the problems posed by the limitations of conventional transportation.

The smaller of the two Aeronutronic-designed vehicles will weigh 8,000 pounds, carry a 2½ ton payload, cruise at 40 mph. It will have a range of 100 miles and a grade capability of 30%.

The big machine is a high-speed, heavy duty carrier. Weight: a hefty 44,500 pounds, payload: 22,000 pounds, speed: a fast 80 mph, range: 300 miles. It, too, will have a grade capability of 30%.

In spite of this evidence of accomplishment, Aeronutronic's work in the field has just begun. Army Transportation Command and Navy contracts are speeding further studies into the potentialities of the new vehicle. The ACV is destined to play a significant role in future military and civilian transportation.

Further information regarding the air cushion vehicle, as well as other exciting projects in work at Newport Beach, may be had by writing to Aeronutronic.



or high water



# ARMY

## front and center

### ANNUAL MEETING REPORT

This is the seventh year ARMY has devoted an entire issue to reporting the proceedings of the annual meetings of the Association of the U.S. Army. It is not an easy task. Time is usually short. Space is limited. The transfer of prose specifically prepared for oral delivery into print is admittedly awkward and not entirely unlike trying to build a modern building out of materials taken from the wreckage of a Gothic cathedral. (How would you use the stained glass windows?) It is always difficult and painful to cut the texts to size. If ARMY were to undertake to publish every word, a magazine about twice the size of this one would be necessary.

On the whole these annual meeting issues contain much excellent material for the reader who will get a firm foothold and dig in. Just as an example we suggest you turn to page 50 and read Maj. Gen. Frank S. Bowen's report on the defense problems of that vast and strange area we call the Middle East. Where else, than ARMY, we ask, can you get this kind of knowledgeable, detailed information? Information necessary to acquire an understanding of the military implications of an area?

### MEN AND WEAPONS

The Resolutions adopted by AUSA at its September meeting (see page 76) make, we believe, two principal points:

- (1) Active Army strength should be sufficient to meet all the missions that may be assigned it; and
- (2) Since an army can be no better than its weapons and equipment, the U.S. Army deserves the best war matériel in quantity the nation can produce.

On the first count it is necessary

to look beyond the present. The actions that are being taken to provide the nation with a wider choice of military responses to aggression were triggered by the Berlin crisis. But the nation must, as the President has suggested, look beyond Berlin, beyond the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, beyond Laos and Cuba, and consider all aspects of the threat.

To win this struggle we cannot afford to carry around the worn baggage of old shibboleths. Our leaders should not be deterred by age-old myths that Americans should not fight on this or that continent, or against this or that enemy.

Our pledge to Berlin is a commitment all Americans now understand. Less clearly seen, but no less vital, is the need to hold for freedom those areas of Asia, the Middle East and Africa not now subject to the brutal boot of the communist aggressor. Communist inroads into our own Western Hemisphere remain a threat and must be countered. Weaker nations of the world cannot resist the superior forces of Sino-Soviet aggression by themselves. Forces of these weaker nations will stand firm only if bolstered by the forces of the United States, as in Korea in the early 1950s. All of these requirements necessitate a larger active Army with a broader reserve base in a firmer state of battle readiness.

The attainment and maintenance of the necessary active Army strength places even greater emphasis than ever on the need to attain rapidly the second objective of modern weapons and equipment.

Only by accelerating the modernization of the Army can it be assured that American troops in future combat will have *tactical superiority* — a critical requirement for successful execution of a measured force strategy. Without tactical superiority from the very outset, there would be grave danger

that limited hostilities would expand in scope, intensity or duration. Moreover, as indicated in the preamble to the AUSA 1961 Resolutions, there is a moral obligation involved when the American soldier is called on to risk his life to impose our national will upon the course of history. He deserves as well as needs the best military tools and support that his people can produce.

The 1961 Resolutions of the AUSA are framed to meet the long-range military requirements of our nation and to fulfill the moral obligation the nation has to the men who serve in the uniform of our country.


### STRAC/TAC COMBINE

Much belated, a definite first step has been taken to restore tactical unity to joint operations of the Army and Air Force. The unification of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) under the command of Lt. Gen. Paul D. Adams of the Army is one of the most welcome and significant actions of the McNamara regime.

Neither a name for the new command nor a headquarters site had been chosen as ARMY went to press. But more importantly, organizational studies by a joint planning staff are under way.

Its first task will be to develop tactical doctrine and conduct joint training exercises for its air and ground components. The experiences of World War II and Korea amply demonstrate the need for unity of command of close support operations at the lowest feasible level. But just as important is the development of cooperative mutual understanding between air and ground soldiers.

In the years since 1945 weird and complicated—and largely unmanageable—methods of close air support were devised and tried out. But none fully succeeded. And hovering always in the background as a taunt and reproach was the excellent and workable Marine Corps close support system. The new command has an excellent opportunity, it would seem, to develop a comparable system; a straightforward system that recognizes



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## FRONT AND CENTER

that unity of command and economy of force are necessary on the battlefield.

When the STRAC/TAC system is developed, it should be extended beyond STRAC/TAC and into the operations of forward deployed ground and air forces.

There is pressing need for such an integration of close support operations in Europe. The close air support of Seventh Army is not what it should be (as an article we plan to publish in a month or two will, we think, demonstrate). The same is doubtlessly true with our forces in Pacific-Asia, especially the Eighth Army in Korea.

At the press conference where he announced formation of General Adams' new command, Mr. McNamara had some pithy answers to questions. One, inevitably, was whether marines would be included in the new command.

Not necessary, Mr. McNamara replied. The Marine Corps already had tactical air and ground forces integrated under one command.

Asked if command of the joint

force will be rotated between the Army and Air Force, Mr. McNamara's answer was equally laconic. "Not necessarily," he said.

In years to come a Secretary of Defense may find it necessary to answer those questions a little more fully. But for the time and place the answers were adequate.

### THE VALUE OF POSITION

The analogy between today's global frontier strategy and the system of frontier forts in the Old West has been often noted but little explored. Yet it merits more than passing attention from military men. It offers instructive insights to the timeless relationship between strategy and military position. Thoughtfully pursued, it may even lead us to a better understanding of what is at stake today in Berlin.

Just as today, not every American appreciated the need for a far-flung network of military positions in the days of the Old West. Then, as now, the degree of appreciation

was often in inverse ratio to the distance from immediate danger.

The settlers out West recognized very well the need for the network of frontier forts. They knew that their lives and the future development of our country depended upon it. But back East, where there was no threat from hostile Indians and lawless elements, recognition of the strategy's national importance was sometimes lacking.

Consequently, the budget for maintaining the forts with well-equipped troops was often very lean. As in recent years, economies sometimes cut to the bone. In some cases, forts had to be abandoned; others were under-manned. There were times when even the Indians were better armed than our troops. After the Civil War, for example, some hostile bands had repeating rifles while soldiers were still issued single-shots.

By the turn of the century, technological evolution and national growth had brought our country closer to Europe and Asia than Fort Douglas, Utah, had once been to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Instead of a continental strategy, our national security required an *intercontinental* strategy.

At first, however, there was small need to implement our intercontinental strategy with our own ground forces. Our naval power ensured freedom of the seas and provided mobile bases for positioning ground forces in emergency. Because of the national potential behind them, token forces were usually enough to restore order and protect our national interests.

But this chapter of our history must be interpreted realistically if we are to apply its lessons wisely today. The reason that sea power and token ground forces sufficed to implement our strategy was *not because strong military positions on other continents were unnecessary to our security*. It was only because the positions were occupied by the ground forces of our traditional friends and allies.

Even before America's emergence as a world power, friendly ground forces guarded us against the gravest strategic disaster that

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1.4

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## FRONT AND CENTER

could possibly occur to the peace-loving nations of the world. *That strategic disaster is the mastery of the Eurasian land mass by a single war-like power!*

The strategic implications of the Eurasian land mass were obvious to would-be world rulers long before Hitler studied geopolitics. As far back as Napoleon's time, the danger was recognized by farsighted men on both sides of the Atlantic. Even then, it was obvious that no other nation could compete with the master of so much of the world's population, resources and technical know-how. When Napoleon retreated from Moscow, we may be sure that there were sighs of relief in Washington as well as London.

Twice it has been the Germans who tried to grasp the geopolitical key to world domination. Twice the military positions of allied ground forces in Eurasia had delayed the enemy's ground forces until America's potential could be brought to bear. But it is significant that knowledge of American potential failed to deter either attempt. In both cases, the weakness of the ground forces actually in position to oppose German ambitions tempted attack.

With advent of the A-bomb and V-J Day, most Americans forgot the importance of strategic position. The costly lessons of World Wars I and II were considered obsolete. With our new potential for swift delivery of massive destruction, it was thought that only token ground forces would be necessary. Some theorists even claimed that the nuclear-armed bomber alone could implement our intercontinental strategy.

So prevalent was this philosophy in the public mind after the Korean conflict that the very word POSITION disappeared from the definition of strategy in our dictionaries. Instead of "the art and science of military position," strategy became "the science of military movement" in popular usage.

Meanwhile, the communist strategists strengthened their position on the Eurasian land mass by occupying Eastern Europe and con-

quering China. The invasions of Korea and Indochina completed our rude awakening to the danger of another grab for the geopolitical key to world domination.

Today, the composition of the Soviet armed forces shows that control of Eurasia remains the primary objective of communist strategy. For example, consider the Soviet Army's thousands of modern tanks —many of them heavy tanks of 60 tons or more. Those tanks represent a tremendous investment in labor and material resources. They have been produced during the same period as the Soviet Union's successful efforts in space, nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

Why? . . . Why has the Soviet Union sacrificed a big jump in the living standards of its people in order to build those tanks concurrently with its nuclear missile program?

Obviously, the tanks are not intended for defense. It is just as obvious that they are not designed for brushfire wars, or operations in oriental rice paddies, the Himalaya Mountains or tropic jungles. There is only one place in the world where a tank force of this size and weight could be effectively employed by the communists. The place is Western Europe!

Not only in armor, but in tactical aircraft and submarines, the composition of the Soviet armed forces indicates the strategic objective. In short, the Kremlin has developed tools that Hitler lacked for achieving the same age-old ambition.

Since 1950, the ambition has been frustrated by our forward strategy supported by our strategic nuclear capability.

Unfortunately, the critical role played by our ground forces in this strategy is still not popularly recognized. There is still a tendency to think primarily in terms of overseas air bases and their nuclear deterrent. People forget that the communists made their greatest gains in Asia and Europe while we had a nuclear monopoly—but lacked sufficient ground forces to implement a forward strategy. Every square mile of the millions taken by the communists since World War II has


been within range of our nuclear-armed bombers. But not an inch has been invaded within range of a U.S. Army rifleman!

Now that the Soviet Union has an intercontinental nuclear capability, our need for a strong forward strategy is even more urgent than before. Now, more than ever, we must have strong ground forces positioned for speedy repulse of any limited attack before it can mushroom into a mutually destructive general war. Otherwise, we shall be compelled to surrender piecemeal or lay our national survival on the line every time Mr. Khrushchev moves a pawn!

Unless we maintain sufficient forces on the ground to make a blitzkrieg of Western Europe patently impossible, they may reckon the prize to be worth the price! They may be willing to accept extensive damage to their homeland in return for possession of a relatively undevastated Western Europe. Quite logically, they may deem it unlikely that we would employ strategic nuclear weapons against the cities and factories of their hostages—our friends and allies.

Now that the Soviet Union can strike directly at the major source of reinforcement for defending Western Europe, there is much greater danger of a tragic miscalculation by Soviet planners than heretofore. As far back as a year ago, a former Soviet Navy captain publicly confirmed that Soviet general war plans since 1955 have called for a surprise nuclear attack upon the United States. Since the Soviet Union has not developed an intercontinental transportation system for invading North America, obviously their nuclear attack against the U.S. is designed to permit speedy conquest of the rest of Europe and Asia.

It follows that our soldiers positioned in Europe—and those who are preparing to join them—are a critical part of our strategic deterrent to nuclear attack upon American cities. The American soldiers stationed there are literally—not just figuratively—guarding every American home.



*Above are some of the satellites sent into earth orbits, a majority of which were launched by Douglas Thor*


**The Douglas Thor rocket has orbited more satellites than all other rockets combined!**

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
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# ANNUAL

# MEETING



Report on

**THE ARMY'S  
GLOBAL FRONTIERS**



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1 September 1961

TO THE MEMBERS  
OF THE ASSOCIATION  
OF THE U.S. ARMY

I have asked the Secretary of the Army to extend my personal greetings to the members and guests. I am confident that your annual convention will be marked by more than usual quickening of interest in defense matters concerning our country.

These are unusual times which require a more rapid pace and a stronger resolve in everything that we do as a nation. It is my deep and abiding feeling that we cannot afford to be either parochial or partisan in our viewpoints; that this especially applies to the Armed Forces of the United States. The United States Army and its reserve components are being called upon to have more than a million men in uniform in the next few months. These must be trained and dedicated men. In fact, they must be inspired men. These tasks fall particularly to the officers and the non-commissioned officers of the Army. The task of supporting them and their endeavors with the public and in world affairs falls first to the members of this Association.

It is my sincere hope that your deliberations and declarations, especially those made public, will be marked by determination without belligerency. I believe in strong, democratic Armed Forces for our nation and I know you share my belief. My best wishes are with you at your convention and throughout the coming year.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

# THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT

By Lt. Gen. MILTON G. BAKER  
*President, Association of the U. S. Army*

*With minor condensation for reasons of space, this is the statement delivered by AUSA's President on the morning of 6 September. Members desiring President Baker's formal report of the past year's activities may obtain a copy by addressing the Secretary, Association of the United States Army at National headquarters.*

In times such as these, it is good to turn back the pages of history for a moment and examine our problems in the perspective of the ages. In 1621, when the Pilgrim Fathers were threatened with attack by hostile Indians, their military commander, Miles Standish, sent a snakeskin filled with bullets to their chief. It was a clear and convincing argument, and the proposed attack quickly dissipated.

At the outbreak of the American Revolution, some of the Colonies adopted as their flag, a yellow stand-

ard with a coiled rattlesnake, under which appeared the legend: "Don't Tread On Me."

Traditions such as these have epitomized our people across the span of three and a half centuries. Only tyrants seem to have difficulty in comprehending the American mind, and their most famous last words have been, "The Americans won't fight." Both the Kaiser and Hitler said it, and the ironic laughter of their false prophecy will pursue their shadows through all eternity. Khrushchev should read American history before he makes the same fatal mistake.

And, if he can't understand English, he should understand that behind the United States soldiers who stand guard at the sector line in Berlin is the most powerful country on the face of this earth. The relatively few square miles of West Berlin—an oasis in the arid desert of Communism—has become another Lexington. And the Brandenburg Gate may some day bear the inscription, taken from our own text: "Where free men shall stand."

Your Association has pledged its support and co-operation to the President. The course he has taken, a course of firmness, is the only sound approach. It is supported by a military build-up along the lines which the Association has been recommending for the past five years, and which we incorporated in our brochure, *Security of the Nation*.

The concept of massive retaliation is no longer our primary tool of war and diplomacy. A strategy of flexible response and graduated deterrence, which we have advocated, appears to be assuming its rightful place in our military posture. Since the Soviet technique is to artificially create crises in different areas, such as Suez, Laos and diversified spots, it is essential that we have "fire brigades" ready to move quickly to support those nations with whom we have treaty commitments.

So long as the Soviets can use factions to promote trouble, we can expect crises. They can achieve this without use of their own manpower to any great extent, and mask their own ambitions behind the facades of their satellites.

Only when their own economy begins to suffer, and they are forced to look to their internal welfare, will we be able to assume that tensions will be lessened.

The increased appropriations, just authorized by



**Lt. Gen. MILTON G. BAKER**

the Congress, will enable the Army to carry out its modernization program. It is interesting to note that the rise in the authorized strength of the Army is just eight thousand more than the Association has been recommending for years, and the National Guard and Reserve are to be maintained at their present level. The Association, you may recall, strongly resisted efforts to cut that level a few years ago.

There are still a number of Association recommendations which need recognition or implementation.

The American people have not been informed of the threat of chemical and biological warfare. About sixty-two million dollars were appropriated this year for research, in this field. This represents an increase of only fifteen per cent. Far more will be needed.

Our resolution calling for immediate production of Nike-Zeus on a national crash basis has *not* been attained. This is regrettable, because every day's delay is a day of production lost.

The Army and Defense Departments are giving extensive study to the ROTC program, and hope to

evolve such an attractive format that it will succeed on a voluntary basis. Until that nebulous possibility materializes, we shall continue to urge compulsory basic ROTC in all colleges.

There have been no significant shifts in Defense Department attitudes toward our resolution urging removal of weight and range limitations on Army aircraft and missiles.

Nor has any action been taken by the Congress to equalize retirement pay for those who retired prior to the passage of the 1958 Military Pay Act, with those who retired after it became law. We will continue to press for elimination of this discrimination.

On the whole, however, the Association's recommendations have had a substantial degree of success.

One matter of concern I would ask you to think about, is popularly called the "gag rule" which, next to foreign aid, has occupied considerable attention in the Congress.

It would appear that the wording of all officers' commissions, that is: "Reposing special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities"

## ***John J. McCloy Receives George C. Marshall Memorial***



Mr. McCloy, flanked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and AUSA President Milton G. Baker, after he had received the George C. Marshall medal from AUSA

*In his introductory remarks at the George Catlett Marshall Memorial Dinner, Mr. Rusk had this to say about General Marshall and Mr. John J. McCloy—recipient of AUSA's 1961 George C. Marshall Memorial Medal:*

It is not easy for me to speak in measured tones about George Catlett Marshall—a rigorous and accomplished soldier who was, at the same time, one of the greatest civilians of his day. Few men have had such profound influence upon all who served with him; he brought to living reality, for all around him, such simple notions as duty, justice, integrity, and love of country. He left his associates a rich legacy of practical wisdom—not in polished essays but in countless fleeting comments in the course of daily business. "Don't ask me a question," he would say, "without bringing me your proposed answer." "Don't wait for me to tell you what you ought to be doing—you tell me what I ought to be doing." Or—"Gentlemen, let's not talk about this matter too much in military terms; to do so might make it a military problem."

You could have found no more suitable recip-

is broad enough to imply faith in an officer's talents to explain to his men and to an audience, the nature of the things we are prepared to fight for and fight against.

I am not suggesting that officers should criticize matters of policy established by their superiors, but I certainly think that an officer who has pledged himself to die, if needs be, to protect and defend the United States, has an absolute right to point out the difference between the virtues of the Constitution of the United States and the vices of the Communist Manifesto.

Turning from the national problems to our Association concerns, I want to commend those of you who have done so much to make your chapters successful. I need not stress the necessity for a close working relationship. It is obvious.

Our industry phase has grown appreciably. Eighty-three industrial concerns are now sustaining members. Last March we conducted a classified symposium on Army Aviation for our industrial members, at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and next month we will hold a

similar session on Tactical Mobility at Fort Knox.

The Association's Army Memorial Museum, to be constructed adjoining Independence and Carpenter's Halls in Philadelphia, is marching forward under the able direction of Lieutenant General C. B. Ferenbaugh. It is hoped that all the membership will generally support the furtherance of this project.


I am happy to report that this year, the Association has instituted a leadership award at the United States Military Academy. The annual recipient will be the First Captain of the Corps of Cadets, and in addition to his personal award, his name will be embossed on a bronze plaque which will contain the names of all First Captains past, present, and future. As part of this award, the Association will also make a substantial annual contribution to the Cadet Chapel Organ Fund, in the name of the First Captain.

In conclusion the Association extends special greetings to our distinguished guests from at home and abroad. It is hoped that this Sixty-one Convention will be a memorable event for all participants, and will serve as a renewal of our deep and abiding faith in the stability and strength of the United States Army.

## *Medal for 'Selfless Service to the United States'*

ient for the George C. Marshall award than John J. McCloy. He has served his country well, in distinguished posts, but none calling for more imagination, clarity of thought, and persistence than the one he now holds as the President's Adviser on Disarmament. A man with less courage would abandon the task, a man with less humor would find it intolerable, a man with less hope for the future of man would give up in despair. The necessity for his effort is simply explained—we shall not find our way through the troubled world of today unless we keep working toward the world which must come into being if man is to survive.

Others have shown interest in the fact that General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during the greatest war in our history, also earned the Nobel Peace Prize. So, too, that a former Assistant Secretary of War now heads our work on Disarmament. We in America do not find this odd. For in their own lives these men remind us of both the olive branch and the arrows in our Great Seal, the symbols of a people who love peace but who take their liberties seriously in a dangerous world.



General of the Army George C. Marshall in late 1943 when he was bearing the heavy burden of global war

## CLARITY—AT A MOMENT OF CRISIS

By **DEAN RUSK**  
*Secretary of State*

I wish to speak briefly this evening about danger and some of the simple truths which moments of crisis clarify. If what I say is not new, it is because our commitment to freedom is as old as our Republic. We ourselves must try to be clear if others are to understand—at a time when the world cannot afford misunderstanding. We must find ways to make it clear that our desire to live in peace is not weakness—and to make it clear that our readiness to fight for freedom is not belligerence.

The forces of aggression in the world are trying to sow confusion, as have other aggressors in other dec-

ades. "All we want is a peace treaty," they say, but a peace treaty which threatens the peace. "All we want is a free city of Berlin"—but the freedom they have in mind can be seen across the walls and through the barbed wire which divide that city. "Settle Berlin and the way will be open for a period of peace and relaxation," they say. "Just once more" is a familiar phrase we have heard before—the nerve gas to prepare the way for endless appetite and ambition.

Their hope must be that we and the rest of the world will have short memories about this postwar world. Though we have all lived through it, we ourselves sometimes forget.

The United States emerged from the Second World War at a pinnacle of power never before achieved by any nation. Our productive facilities were incomparable and, alone among the larger industrialized nations, were unscathed by bomb or shell. We had a great army and the mightiest sea and air forces the world had ever seen. These were deployed around the globe on every sea and continent. We had developed a fantastic weapon, and we alone had it.

One thinks of Lord Acton's thought that "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." It has been refuted by the course pursued by the United States in the last sixteen years.

It is not a small thing in the history of the world that a nation with supreme, well-nigh unchallengeable, power turned away from the exploitation of that power, from the corrupting policies which power could entail. We committed ourselves wholeheartedly to building a peaceful world order based on the principles which were written into the United Nations Charter.

We took a leading role in creating the United Nations. I know of no better statement of the enduring purposes of the foreign policy of the American people than Articles 1 and 2 of that Charter.

Every nation which joined the United Nations joined in solemn commitments to renounce and suppress aggression and to settle disputes by peaceful means. Machinery was established to facilitate peaceful settlements—the Security Council, the General Assembly, the International Court. The members



Mr. Rusk

pledged themselves to use not only these bodies but the traditional processes of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.

When one thinks of that great document, one remembers the hopes that went into its drafting. In the vernacular of the GI, it looked as if "man almost had it made."

We not only abided by the principles of the United Nations and dedicated ourselves to constructing the sort of world envisioned by the Charter. We also moved to dismantle our own military power. In fact, we disarmed unilaterally and precipitately. By the end of 1946 we had no single Army division and no Air Force group ready for combat.

We still had an atomic monopoly. But we proposed to divest ourselves of atomic weapons, too. I was on the General Staff when Hiroshima occurred. I remember a remark of a colleague: "War has turned upon and devoured itself, for no human purpose can be achieved by war under these conditions." We as a nation believed that. We presented a plan for the international control of atomic energy, to assure that it would be used only for the peaceful benefit of all the peoples of the world and to avoid the kind of nuclear arms race which is subjecting the world to terror today. We most earnestly endeavored to get the United Nations to put that plan into effect. Our efforts were frustrated by one member: the Soviet Union.

We also sought to activate Article 47 of the Charter, providing for establishment of a United Nations force to be available to the Security Council itself, assisted by a Military Staff Committee—a force to be used in keeping the peace.

And, not least, we repeatedly have tried to give effect to the provisions of Articles 26 and 47 for establishing a system for the regulation of armaments.

Why have these hopes, which we are convinced are the hopes of most of mankind, been frustrated? Why have all our efforts borne so little fruit? The central reason is that one government refused to join with the rest in building the kind of world the United Nations Charter envisioned and, instead, embarked upon a course of aggression.

The Soviet Union contemptuously reneged on its wartime pledges to permit self-determination in Eastern Europe. It supported an aggression against Greece, thinly disguised as a "civil war." It tried to intimidate Turkey into yielding concessions which would have jeopardized the independence of Turkey and exposed other nations in the eastern Mediterranean and beyond to aggression.

Counting on economic chaos as its ally, the Soviet Union sought to extend its dominion into Western Europe. In 1948, in violation of its agreements with the Western Allies, it blockaded Berlin, denounced the quadripartite control machinery for Germany, and set about making the part of Germany which it occupied

a political and social segment of the Soviet Union itself. Then came the aggression in Korea. A little later came the ruthless suppression of Hungary.

One incident after another has made it quite clear that the Soviet Union will not tolerate self-determination by any people over whom it can extend its sway. One incident after another has demonstrated that it is not prepared to work toward a world of law. As one Soviet representative put it: "The law is like the tongue of a wagon: it goes in the direction in which it is pointed." Or, as other representatives have put it: "The Soviet Union will not submit its interests to decision by anyone else." Such a policy—and its corollary, the Troika, which would paralyze the executive functions of the United Nations—torpedoes the possibility of law, of adjudication, of mediation, of peaceful settlement, peaceful adjustment of conflicting interests.

That declared policy of non-cooperation, plus modern weapons—plus the Soviets' terroristic threats to employ those weapons—gives dramatic content to the words used by Thomas Hobbes in describing the law of the jungle: "nasty, brutish, and short."

Against this background, the meaning of the cold war becomes clearer. We did not declare it; we ourselves cannot end it. The cold war is the direct expression of the announced determination of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to extend their "historically inevitable" world revolution by every available means. It is a program of action, which they sometimes try to dis-

*The world must know  
that our desire  
to live in peace is  
not weakness . . .  
that our readiness  
to fight for freedom  
is not belligerence*

guise as a scientific principle. They speak of the irresistible spread of ideas—but have yet to show a single instance of a people who have voluntarily embraced communism through free elections. The cold war will end when those who declared it decide to abandon it. Otherwise, it cannot end so long as peoples throughout the world are determined to be free, to decide their own institutions, to control their own destinies.

The Soviet leaders do have in their hands a revolutionary potential more dramatic than anything we have yet seen. That lies in their capacity to transform the world in which we live by a simple decision to live at peace with it. One can experience no more startling a reflection than to imagine what could be within the grasp of mankind if the principles of the United Nations Charter were deeply established as the rule of conduct of all nations, including the Soviet Union. We are familiar with the capacity of law to enlarge the areas of individual freedom by simple arrangements for protecting each against the undue intrusion of the others. We have made great progress in applying a rule of law across national frontiers in arranging the countless daily transactions of the world's work. Already, throughout most of the world, there is in progress every day, throughout the year, acts of cooperation which support what Raymond Fosdick has called "the infinity of threats which bind peace together." But a large, important and powerful part of the world has not joined this effort and, indeed, seeks to disrupt it. This is the great challenge to Soviet leadership; this is the direction in which they can move to write brilliant chapters in the history of man. If they are another world, it is their own choice; in the world we know, there is room for all who are prepared to join in carrying forward the promise which lies within the grasp of man.

In the field of disarmament, Soviet leaders hold in their hands another crucial key. It is not difficult to disarm the United States; we are a people who would prefer to turn our resources to other purposes. The most effective way to disarm is to begin by keeping the peace—to demonstrate over time that they will leave their neighbors alone. If the United States is spending for arms today almost four times what we spent in the immediate postwar years, it is not because we prefer it that way, or because economic prosperity depends upon it. We do so reluctantly, as a harsh necessity. Without the clear necessity, the American people could not be compelled to sustain so heavy a burden for arms.

Obviously, what I have suggested would take time—time which we may not have. The arms race produces its own tension. If we could find a way to limit that race before broad political issues are resolved we should make the effort. Here, again, the key is not in our hands. Important steps could be taken promptly if those involved would abandon the fetish of secrecy.

Disarmament cannot occur if those who are prepared to act in good faith and with full public knowledge are to become what Aristide Briand called "dupes or victims." We must continue our own effort to achieve reasonable and practical proposals; present tensions make the effort more and not less essential. This is why we hope very much that the Congress will complete action at this session on President Kennedy's proposals for a Disarmament Agency.

The months ahead will be critical months and much will turn on the issue of Berlin. President Kennedy has called it "the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments, stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation." He has called upon our own people and upon our Allies to undertake fresh sacrifices to give the free world the additional strength we shall need to keep the peace or to meet the dangers which might arise. Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze discussed these matters with you yesterday.

At the very time he called for greater strength, President Kennedy said, "We shall always be prepared to discuss international problems with any and all nations that are willing to talk—and listen—with reason . . . If they seek genuine understanding—not concessions of our rights, we shall meet with them. . . . We cannot negotiate with those who say 'what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.'"

We expect negotiations on Berlin as soon as it is apparent that negotiations of a serious and constructive character can occur. We cannot believe that any power could press so dangerous an issue without full exploration with all whose interests and pledges are involved. There are channels of communication available between Moscow and the West; they are not being neglected. The problem is whether channels can lead to a meeting of minds, whether peace is a common purpose, whether there are arrangements, in the President's words, "consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom, and with the legitimate security interests of all nations."

If peaceful processes are to succeed, they must be given their chance. This means that unilateral action taken against the vital interests of the free world in West Berlin could only court disaster. There have been threats and implied threats of such action in recent weeks, with particular regard to allied air traffic into Berlin. These threats have been rejected promptly and in the most solemn terms by the Western powers. I spoke earlier of clarity. It is possible for those who do not understand democracy to make a mistake about these matters—by listening only to the voices they wish to hear, by confusing debate with disunity, by reading a desire for peace as a willingness to yield. These are mistakes which Moscow cannot afford and which mankind cannot afford.

## A KEY MOMENT OF CRISIS

By PAUL H. NITZE  
*Assistant Secretary of Defense*

In recent weeks we have seen a series of decisions affecting the strengthening of the United States Army. I believe we will see further such decisions in coming weeks. It is appropriate, therefore, that I use the occasion of this annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army to say a few words about the world situation which has made and is making these decisions necessary.

In the first place it is clear for all to see that the current crisis is Mr. Khrushchev's crisis. He has taken the initiative. He has chosen the timing. He has made the demands. He has issued the threats. He has specified the deadlines. He could call off the crisis if he

wished to. He is acting in the classic role of the aggressor.

The crisis focuses on Berlin, an enclave with its access routes running through Soviet-controlled territory. But the current crisis is broader than Berlin. It involves a total confrontation of Soviet Bloc objectives and those of the non-Communist world.

The Soviet leaders style themselves as "peace lovers"; the Socialist camp, they say, desires only peace. Let us analyze what this really means. Secretary Rusk has already pointed out the extraordinary perversion of language which allows totalitarian regimes to style themselves as "democracies" and to label Western measures for "defense" as "aggression." On the other hand, when the Russians say they are "peace loving," this does express a preference of a type; for they would, of course, prefer to gain domination without military conflict. In their terms, the West should show its dedication to the cause of peace by acquiescing to all Soviet demands, even the most outrageous, thus helping to prove the Communist dogma that the triumph of what they call "Socialism" will be achieved without war. I think it essential that all free men understand this Soviet view of the world. However inverted the logic may appear to us, it is quite clear that they seriously contend that the only danger to "peace" is from those who propose to stand firm against their aggression, those who would risk war rather than surrender the values of a free society. As Clausewitz put it very succinctly years ago, the aggressor is always peace-loving, for he wants to enter the territory of his victim unopposed. Clausewitz said war exists for the benefit of the defender; it comes about only if the defender wishes to fight for his vital interests rather than surrender them.

Let us turn now to the specific case of Berlin. The West's objectives are simple and straightforward: we are committed to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin and the viability of the city itself, which means there must be the right of free access to Berlin. To guarantee that right the continued garrisoning of the city by forces of the three Western powers is necessary. The Soviet prime objectives are



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to eliminate the window on Eastern Europe represented by Berlin—which they have in part accomplished by sealing off the Eastern portion of the city—and to compel at least a de facto recognition of the East German state and its present boundaries. They wish to undermine the Western military presence in West Berlin and to bring it firmly under the thumb of the East Germans and the Russians.

Speaking personally, I am convinced that there is also a much broader Communist objective involved, of which Berlin is merely a proving ground. This is to impose on the West and on the U. S. by the application of threats of force, and terror tactics, a psychological defeat by purporting to demonstrate our impotence in the face of the much advertised Soviet power. Concurrently, by a combination of threats and cajolery, they hope to break up the unity of the NATO alliance and undermine the will of some or all of its members to resist the Communist program. If the Communists were to succeed in these objectives, the effects would invariably be felt not only in Western Europe but throughout the world—in Indochina, in the Far East, in the Near East, in Africa and in Latin America.

The Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing is clearly a part of this scheme of intimidation. The timing of the announcement was, in effect, a calculated thumbing of the nose at the convocation of non-aligned nations in Belgrade. It said, in essence, "we are strong, we are armed, we shall do as we please." In direct opposition to the words of our own Declaration of Independence, they flaunt an "indecent, disregard" for the opinions of mankind.

The neutral nations believe that the Soviet attitude is fixed and unchangeable—an impression the Soviets have done their best to confirm—and that, therefore, it is the West which must draw back and, if necessary, appease the Soviet Union if World War III is to be avoided. This mistaken view lends support to the Soviet "salami tactics" by which the Soviets would hope to avoid an occasion where the issue of war would arise unambiguously as at Pearl Harbor. It is more likely they will try to force a series of Western withdrawals—no one of which would appear sufficiently important to require a clearcut decision to go to war, yet in the aggregate would constitute a Western defeat. But the Communists should understand that though democracies have great patience and forbearance, there eventually comes a point where one more straw will break the camel's back of that forbearance. Any interference with our essential rights in Berlin must be viewed by us as the straw that breaks the camel's back.

Berlin is the focus of a larger problem. Our capacities to meet the Berlin situation extend beyond the confines of the city and its access routes. I was reminded of this during the recent negotiations at Geneva over

the problem of Laos. To emphasize his argument, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, repeatedly pointed at a map of Laos marked to show territories said to be held by the different forces, saying "Just look at the map." The question was not what one would see on *that* map, but whether that map was the right one. Was it big enough? Mr. Gromyko wished us to center attention on a map restricted to an area of preponderant advantage to the Communists—not on a bigger map showing our respective strengths on a global scale. The point is that we can offset a local preponderance of Communist strength by a determination to apply Western strength on terms other than those selected by the Soviets. Soviet tanks across the autobahn to Berlin would interpose at only one of the many points throughout the world where the important or vital interests of the Soviet empire are vulnerable.

In meeting the Berlin—or other Communist challenges, general nuclear war should not be our only recourse. But let me be very clear: We must first have nuclear striking power before our other capacities to meet these challenges can be effective. Thus, one of the first tasks to which this Administration addressed itself was the strengthening of our nuclear deterrent capabilities both for the immediate future and the longer range future.

To achieve this the United States took a series of measures.

- (1) We moved to improve our missile deterrent by emphasizing hidden, moving or invulnerable delivery systems. We accelerated the program for building of the Polaris submarine force. We expanded the development of the solid-fuel Minuteman. We are developing improved air-to-ground missiles, such as the Skybolt.
- (2) To protect our existing bomber forces for their nuclear deterrent role, we have increased our ground and airborne alert capacities and are working to install bomb alarm detectors and signals at key warning and communications points and all SAC bases.
- (3) We are constructing and improving our continental defense and warning systems such as BMEWS and the satellite-borne Midas system to add precious additional minutes to our warning of an attack.
- (4) We are examining with care the problem—organizational and technical—of command and control of nuclear weapons to assure that the decision to use such weapons can be responsibly exercised under the authority of the President and to minimize the risks of triggering war by accident or miscalculation.

(5) As an insurance policy to mitigate devastation of our population should there be a nuclear war, we are seriously undertaking a program of civilian defense.

(6) In spite of the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, we shall still strongly support sensible proposals for achievement of responsible arms control.

If a strong nuclear force were all we had to meet Communist challenges, a situation of superior local Communist strength might force on us the alternatives of either national humiliation or all-out war. For this reason, the second goal of the Administration is to strengthen and expand the intermediate options in terms of military force. In these intermediate options the U. S. Army plays a vital role. Our ability to respond to these challenges with increased levels of force short of all-out war has been neglected in the past. We are doing our best to make the necessary adjustments.

Starting with President Kennedy's special message on the defense budget in March, the United States has begun a new emphasis on increased conventional capability. These include: expanding research on non-nuclear weapons; procurement of new, longer-range, modern air-lift aircraft and more sea-lift capacities; modification of tactical fighters so they can better handle conventionally armed ordnance items and be better adapted for landing and take-off in different types of terrain; and modest increases in personnel.

In his deep concern over the intransigent attitude of the Soviets over Berlin, President Kennedy spoke to the nation on July 25 urging further measures for short-range improvement of our conventional forces consistent with his basic long-term program. Ships and planes with tactical air power, air-lift, sea-lift and antisubmarine warfare capabilities are being retained in service or reactivated, and the deactivation of certain B47 bombers is being deferred. Draft calls are being substantially increased. We are filling out present Army divisions and making certain increases in the Navy and Air Force, and Secretary McNamara recently announced certain call-ups of the Reserves, reflecting our concern for improvement of our readiness for combat in event of further deterioration of the Berlin situation. I expect that you will see more measures to improve this readiness in the very near future. The series of measures to date is designed to fill gaps in our existing forces—particularly those in Western Europe—to increase their training and readiness and to supplement them with crucial needs for an improved conventional capability. They are part of both a short-term and a long-term effort to enhance the capacity of the United States and of its allies to fight effectively at the nonnuclear level while concurrently retaining and improving a strong and ready nuclear deterrent.

The increases in conventional capability will strengthen, and not weaken, our policy of deterring war. For the ability to commit forces in the intermediate range makes more credible to the USSR the certain prospect that we will back our nonnuclear forces by the use of our strategic capabilities should that be necessary.

In summary, we have great nuclear capabilities. We are not particularly impressed with the Soviet threat to develop nuclear weapons in the 100-megaton range. We are not interested in arms of a terroristic nature, but rather our nuclear capability is tailored to specific tasks. We have a tremendous variety of warheads which gives us the flexibility we require to conduct nuclear actions from the level of large-scale destruction to mere demolition work. I could not, of course, give specific numbers, but I can say that the number of nuclear delivery vehicles of all types which the U. S. possesses provides the flexibility for virtually all modes and levels of warfare.

At the same time, we have a growing nonnuclear capability with a large growth potential. The economic base represented by the U. S. and our Western European allies far outdistances that of the Communist Bloc. But to apply it to the development of enough conventional military power to offset fully the Communist conventional power will require determination, will and sacrifice. I can only assure you that as these are called for by developments, the Administration will ask for them in the full confidence that the American people will respond as they always have when their leaders lay great issues before them, and that our allies will do their share.

Today's Berlin crisis focuses the basic issue as to the course of the next hundred or so years of the world's history. We now appear to be at a key moment of crisis. The next ninety days and beyond may well see the test which will decide whether that future history will be one of richness and diversity in the world or whether it will simply be one of bleak conformity to a world-wide totalitarianism. Even successfully surmounting the challenges of the next ninety days or even the next year will not solve all our problems. The basic Communist challenge will continue. We are going to have to meet it on all fronts—political, economic, military and psychological—if freedom is not to perish from the face of the earth. On the military front, our effectiveness may well depend on the number of options which we possess and with which we can respond flexibly to a wide range of possible provocations. In large measure, it is the ground forces of the U. S. Army which will give us this military flexibility. This is one important reason why I have considered it such a privilege to address you, the Association of the U. S. Army, at this time.

## WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

By **ELVIS J. STAHR, JR.**  
*Secretary of the Army*

At this critical point in history, it would be difficult to imagine a subject of greater significance to a forum of free men than national defense. I therefore welcome this opportunity to take part in the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, where the Army's vital role in this defense will be so earnestly and competently discussed.

In the few years since its organization, the AUSA has proved to be a good friend, a reliable advisor, and a capable advocate of the Army cause. You have wisely chosen to demonstrate your loyalty and sincere concern, not by a mere chauvinistic devotion to an

organization, but by honestly seeking to determine what roles and missions the Army can best perform in modern war and what could be done by you to help the Army keep its capabilities abreast of its growing responsibilities.

The record speaks for the success of your efforts, and I am honored to have been asked to welcome you here as you turn to a consideration of the items on this year's agenda. Your meeting falls in a period of mounting tension, and I can assure you that your interest, counsel, and support are more valuable than ever before.

This being the first occasion I have had as Secretary of the Army to address the Association of the United States Army as a whole, my remarks this morning will be in the nature of a review of the period of my tenure of office, as well as the opening remarks for your meeting this year.

The first seven months of this Administration have been, to say the least, eventful. This has been particularly true in those fields which most directly concern the international statesman and the soldier. From invaded Laos to the seduced and deceived island of Cuba—from the edge of space to the edge of the Free World in Berlin, one crisis has tumbled on the heels of another. As the link in the chain of command between the Army and the Administration, I would like, first of all, to give you my view of the situation as it now relates to the Army.

Next—while recognizing that the rising tempo of communist threats has crystallized our national resolve, as impending danger so often does, and led to real, measurable progress—there is still much to be done and I would like to tell you what I deem our most important Army tasks to be in the months ahead.

As far as I know, none of our civilian personnel people have gotten around to writing a job description for the Secretary of the Army. To be sure, the various acts which provide the statutory basis for the office spell out his responsibilities and describe his authority, but the restrained legal language in them gives little hint as to how he should go about his daily duties. Since we are all vitally interested in the



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Department of the Army, I will conclude my remarks by telling you how I propose to discharge my obligations.

A survey of the present international situation quickly reveals many things on both the black and the red sides of the Nation's ledger, and this was true when this Administration first took office.

To back up our sincere desire for peace, this Nation has developed the strongest deterrent force in history, composed of the powerful and ready retaliatory air and missile forces of the Air Force and the Navy. These must be kept powerful and ready. But these alone are not enough. For the threat is not limited to actions which would call for that kind of response.

The United States Army—and it is our chief interest—today has the highest over-all caliber of officers and non-commissioned officers it has ever had, in peace or war. Its eleven combat-ready divisions and many other fighting units are well-trained, alert, and competent. Morale is high throughout the Army. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve stand at the highest point of peacetime readiness in their long history. Army divisions, strategically deployed along the periphery of the Free World in Europe and Korea, give visible evidence of our determination to carry out our international commitments; they also provide us with forward bases and ready units which would be needed to fulfill those commitments in the event of war. Our overseas deployments are backed by the STRAC, highly-trained and always ready to go anywhere.

Our military forces are supported by an economy of unmatched productivity, traditionally responsive to urgent military needs, and served by a globe-encircling transportation system second to none on earth. These factors give us the basis for a combat and logistical combination to project our national power to any point on the globe and support it there.

The greatest of all our national advantages, however, is our historic unity, particularly in periods of national emergency. A better illustration of this could not be found than the recent heart-warming display of solidarity by the people and the Congress in supporting President Kennedy after he announced his determination to stand firm in Berlin. No piece of ordnance, regardless of how modern or powerful, and no marching legion, regardless of how well armed and equipped, could match the potential might of such unity, when it is translated into wise and firm policies, backed by adequate military power.

There are, of course, some unfavorable aspects of our position, which have challenged this Administration since it first took office. Although the measures taken to deter war have been largely successful so far, they have not completely halted aggressive com-

unist action. I doubt it is mere coincidence that our deterrent policy has been most clearly effective in those areas where the United States Army has deployed strong units in accordance with our forward strategy.

Each element of Army strength has had its serious limitations in recent years, as every thinking man has known. Units deployed to implement our forward strategy—particularly those in Korea—have never been at full strength. The number of STRAC units available for deployment to potential trouble spots has never been sufficient to keep us from robbing Peter to pay Paul. Manning levels in many support units have run consistently below desirable standards.

During the period since the Korean war, when the theory of "massive retaliation" was the guiding principle of our national military policy, Army equipment levels were allowed to drop dangerously low. Budgetary provisions for procurement of both new and replacement items were inadequate for a modern Army with world-wide responsibilities. Fortunately, the excellent cooperation between Army thinkers and civilian technologists went on, and many improved weapons, vehicles, and other kinds of equipment were designed, some of which were manufactured and tested. Few, however, reached the stage of procurement necessary for an Army badly in need of modernization.

Further, I feel that certain "cold war skills," which might have been used to the advantage of the entire Free World, were neglected during the same period. For example, a few strategically placed Army specialists in anti-guerrilla and anti-subversion activities, assisting patriotic leaders in countries willing to stand up in their own defense, might have produced more of the same good results achieved by that handful of Americans in Greece under General Van Fleet not too many years ago.

In summarizing some of our military weaknesses over the past several years, then, I would say that the Army has been under-manned, under-equipped, and under-used.

This trend toward "underplay" of Army potentialities, I am glad to say, has been halted. When President Kennedy took office last January, he lost no time in letting the country know the broad outline of his national defense policies. In a series of talks to the Nation, he declared that this nation could afford to be strong but could not afford to be weak. He promised that we would "pay any price, bear any burden, and oppose any foe" to assure the survival of liberty. He called for a faster rate of modernization for our conventional forces, stressing the fact that we intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action. He emphasized the need to approach the problem of budgeting by determining military needs before calculating the costs—by making the budget

fit requirements instead of bending needs to conform to the budget—in short, by putting the dollar sign where it belongs.

The President backed up each speech with action. His original defense budget showed a substantial increase over amounts already marked for Army use. He asked for an additional increase as reviews of the situation progressed. Finally, with the worsening of the Berlin situation, he asked Congress for an even greater appropriation and widened authority to build up the strength of the Armed Forces through measures which, I am sure, are familiar to this audience.

The resulting benefits will be evident month by month. Increased personnel strength will make possible the reinforcement of our forces in Europe. Seventh Army and other United States units committed to NATO can be brought to full T/O&E strength, and the United States Army in Europe can be raised to a fully combat-ready posture by the addition of combat, combat support, and key logistical units.

With the resources to raise three training divisions to STRAC status, which will give us a total of six combat-ready divisions in our strategic reserve as against the present three, we not only will have greater strength and security at home, but much more flexibility for deploying units to any given trouble spot without weakening commitments elsewhere. Additionally, other courses of action will be open to us with relation to the strength of our deployed forces, our theatre reserves, and our strategic reserves, in the light of the developing situation.

Special Forces, specifically trained for counter-guerrilla and other forms of sub-limited warfare, can now be doubled, enabling us better to support and assist threatened nations before they have been hopelessly weakened by corruptive influences of infiltration and paramilitary aggression.

Congress has provided the Army \$2.532 billion in FY 1962 for the purchase of weapons, ammunition, and equipment, an increase of more than one billion dollars over FY 1961 for this purpose. We plan to spend this money chiefly to beef up firepower, mobility, and battlefield communications, and when we have done so we will have taken a significant step toward meeting the Army's matériel modernization needs while providing simultaneously for expansion and other critical requirements.

With official backing of this kind and extent—amounting to a vindication of Army proposals over the past several years for a more versatile force—the question might well be asked, "Where do we go from here?" The Association of the United States Army can certainly ask this, for you have been with the Army in helping it achieve many of its major objectives, and you have the same interest in keeping the ball rolling.

One course we must pursue now is very clear. The concept of putting the dollar sign where it belongs has a corollary—the obligation to squeeze the most out of every dollar spent. The President has not handed us a signed blank check. He has, in effect, given us a promissory note which is negotiable only when we have determined and can show what our essential military needs are. The shift from an almost total reliance on massive retaliation to the development of forces prepared to meet the entire spectrum of war calls on us to make sure that every ounce of effectiveness is built into the organization, training and use of every single unit. The authorization to raise our manpower ceiling does not in any way relieve us of the responsibility to select, train, assign, and use that manpower to the absolute best of our professional ability. The money we have at last been given for weapons, equipment, and maintenance must be spent with imagination, discrimination, and good old-fashioned cold calculation.

I believe we should give highest priority to getting the absolute maximum use out of the manpower allotted to us. With this aim in mind, the Army staff has been reviewing our manpower situation, seeking ways to make better use of every man. It is equally urgent, however, that all subordinate staffs, and, indeed, each responsible officer and non-commissioned officer of the Army, see to it that he and his organization are using each individual to the best and fullest extent possible. It is not enough to do this simply in a perfunctory way. We must go back and look at each unit in our force—indeed at each basic factor in our planning. We must allot and use men and units as we would if we had to reach into our own pockets to meet the payroll. Our ultimate aim must always be to increase the productivity of each individual and make sure that manpower—our most expensive and important element—provides the greatest return to the organization. Returns, in our case, are measured in increased combat power.

I also sometimes question whether we are setting sufficiently bold objectives in our equipment modification. Although we have developed some magnificent equipment, it seems to me that we must increase our capability by an even more imaginative approach to the development of new fighting tools. To illustrate the nature of the approach I am driving at, I could ask questions like these: Should the family of combat vehicles we plan as successors to the splendid new series be tracked, wheeled, or zero ground pressure? Should they continue to use reciprocating engines? Is a medium tank, based on 1915 concepts, a proper point of departure for future developments, or should we start from scratch with some other and entirely different concept? Can rockets and missiles replace guns?

In the realm of the untried is where we may find our greatest success. Remember, we used to say that "what goes up must come down." We now know that



At the Marshall Memorial Dinner Col. William H. Baumer (left), New Brunswick, N. J., received the President's Gold Medal for service to AUSA and Mr. Benjamin H. Swig (right), San Francisco, received the President's Gold Medal for service to the Army. Vice President Karl R. Bendetson (center) made the awards.

if you throw it up hard enough it won't come down at all. No natural law has been broken here; it has only been extended by deeper study and wider experimentation.

I feel we need to use greater imagination also in developing our plans. We cannot simply warm over World War II concepts, with or without atomic overtones. Even more important, we must plan so that we can use our tools in cold war as well as in hot war—and, employ them anywhere in the world. In this connection, I have been much encouraged by the new idea proposed by the Army staff for meeting current tensions whereby tailored organizations of military personnel would go to underdeveloped countries, at the request of the host country, prepared to assist them not only in strengthening their national security but also in such fields as transportation, preventive medicine, engineering and resource development, and improved communications. Such assistance would be an example of putting to work some of our great and essential capabilities which may not be fully used in peacetime. The hard-working Army staff also deserves great praise and a lot of professional respect for its practically anonymous efforts in developing the ROAD concept—and other new concepts you will probably be hearing about before your next annual meeting.

What I am trying to say is that we must eschew the conservative approach. All of us know that the development of a new weapon or some other piece of hardware will cause enemy consternation for a few months—depending on how long it takes him to copy or counter it—but let us do our planning with the

thought in mind that a completely new idea or concept can set him back for years.

Just to keep you from marking me down at this point as the sort of person who conjures up new tasks for everyone except himself, let me head you off by telling you—as I promised earlier—how I view my own duties and obligations.

I think I can express this by drawing an analogy. The Secretary of the Army is somewhat like a quarterback on a football team—but not one of the T-formation specialists you see in pro football today—not one of those pass-throwing crowd-thrillers who look at the bench for the cue for each play. He is more like the kind of quarterback most of you remember from the Thirties who, having absorbed the instruction and strategy of the coaching staff . . . having worked every day of the season to learn the strengths, weaknesses, and assignments of each man on his team . . . having learned to watch for signs of weakness in his opponents—went out on the field on Saturdays and called signals the best he knew how. And, after calling each play he turned into a blocking back, running interference for the man with the ball.

I expect to call the signals and run interference for the Army ball carriers. I'll take my instructions from the coaching staff—in my case the President and the Secretary of Defense—as any good quarterback would, and I'll call the signals which set up the kind of defense or offense I think they want. At that point I'll start running interference.

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, who served with great distinction in two separate assignments as Secretary of War, must have had a similar thought in mind when he spoke of the civilian Secretary as having a "dual function." "As a responsible public official," he wrote, "it is his duty to insure that the Army serves the broad public interest; as the Army's chief it is his duty to act as the defender of the Army against its enemies and detractors."

Although I agree with Mr. Stimson in principle, I don't honestly believe the Army has any real enemies among our own citizens—but ignorance, misunderstanding, and misapprehension sometimes do cause it to have detractors. If the Army will—and I intend to help it in every way I can—represent itself to executive and congressional leaders as a sincere and honest team player . . . if it will go regularly to the people with its true story . . . if it will turn its own eyes inward for honest self-analysis, and self-correction when needed, I think it will find it has a clear road ahead and nothing to worry about except the soldier's venerable task of marching on.

In closing, let me express again my admiration and appreciation for your loyal and intelligent support of the Army. Your agenda and announced objectives for this year's meeting show that you are still on the right track. I know both the Nation and the Army will benefit from what you accomplish here.



**Columbus-Phenix City-Fort Benning Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for largest overall membership on 30 June 1961.



**Detroit Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for best single meeting program, accepted by Don C. Pippel.



**Baltimore Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for best overall meeting programs, accepted by Paul E. Welch.



**Tennessee Valley Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for the greatest percentage increase in membership between 1 July '60 and 30 June '61, accepted by Donald L. Voorhees.

**AUSA AWARDS PRESENTED AT ANNUAL MEETING**

**Vice President Karl R. Bendetsen presents awards for services to Army and AUSA during the past year**



**Central Savannah River Area Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for being most active in telling the Army story, accepted by D. Douglas Barnard, Jr.



**Virginia Peninsula Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for best membership participation, accepted by Lt. Col. Richard Newman.



**Henry Leavenworth Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for best single promotional program.



Col. John V. Hinkel, Wash., D. C. Certificate of Appreciation for service to the Army.



Ray R. Eppert, Detroit, Mich. Certificate of Appreciation for service to the Army.



Christian P. Fox, El Paso, Tex. Certificate of Appreciation for service to the Army.



Col. Harold H. Newman, Fort Sam Houston, Tex. Certificate of Appreciation for service to the Association of the U. S. Army.



Albert W. Bayer, Los Angeles, Calif. Certificate of Achievement for outstanding service to the Army presented by Gen. Baker.



Maynard R. Ashworth, Columbus, Ga. Certificate of Achievement for outstanding service to the Association of the U. S. Army presented by Gen. Baker.



Judge Thomas W. Caldecott, Oakland, Calif. Certificate of Appreciation for contributions to national defense.



Thomas C. Kempin, Philadelphia, Pa. Certificate of Appreciation for contributions to National Defense.



Maj. Gen. Harry McK. Roper, Wash., D. C. Certificate of Appreciation for service to the Association of the U. S. Army.

More Pictures ➤



**Louisville Chamber of Commerce.** Certificate of Appreciation for contributions to national defense, accepted by Col. Clarence L. Jones.



**East Bay Chapter.** Outstanding chapter award for being most active in pursuit of AUSA objectives, accepted by N. T. Gage.



**Daily Press, Inc.,** Newport News-Hampton, Virginia. Certificate of Appreciation for military news coverage, accepted by W. R. Van Buren.



**General of the Army** Omar Bradley is introduced at the Marshall Memorial dinner



**Former Chief of Staff** Gen. J. Lawton Collins greets the Secretary of the Army



**MSgt. James B. McCarthy** discusses a proposed resolution during the annual AUSA business meeting



**Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau**, Chief of R&D, and the former boss of Army missile development, retired Gen. John B. Medaris



**Assistant Secretary** Paul R. Ignatius addresses the Sustaining Membership luncheon



At the speaker's table during the luncheon on 7 September: Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, JCS, and Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. Nitze was the speaker at this luncheon



Mr. Stahr congratulates 2d Lt. William B. Woodson, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Benning, winner of the 1961 Mershon award



Gen. Weible, President Baker, Mr. Stahr, Gen. Decker and Col. Rockwell greet guests at the reception on Sept. 6



President Baker congratulates Col. Richard M. Lee, CO, 1st Battle Group, 3d Infantry, following military review at Fort Myer



The U. S. Army Chorus with Maj. Laboda conducting, at the Marshall Memorial Dinner on September 8



President Baker chats with ROTC cadets preceding the ROTC luncheon at Patton Hall, Fort Myer

## WHERE STANDS A U. S. SOLDIER, THERE STANDS THE U. S. A.

By Gen. GEORGE H. DECKER  
*Chief of Staff, U. S. Army*

The United States Army has long been modern in its thinking, its training, its organization, and in the research and development of new weapons. The full realization of the Administration's new defense program will go far toward establishing it as a modern Army in fact, and improve significantly its capability to support an effective forward strategy on a worldwide basis.

I would emphasize that the Army believes our defense should be based on a balance of nuclear and conventional weapons and a balance of land, sea, and air forces. We have at all times stressed that the military threat is across the board; that to build a nuclear deterrent and neglect conventional arms is to invite aggression by conventional forces. In a like manner, to overbuild conventional forces at the expense of an adequate nuclear deterrent is to invite nuclear blackmail.

The Army is always aware that even with our country's enormous resources, there are limits to the money that can be spent on its armed forces. These limitations make it even more essential that nuclear and conventional forces be kept in balance.

The nuclear age notwithstanding, the presence of the American soldier in threatened areas remains the most visible and concrete evidence of our determination to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies in the defense of the free world. The citizens of West Berlin, who on last August 20th welcomed with such enthusiasm the arrival of an additional U.S. Army battle group, were acknowledging the most earnest pledge that could be given of the firm U.S. intention to defend the city. The moral impact of this reinforcement was far more important than its material addition to the Berlin garrison.

Since the beginning of the cold war, the deployment of American military forces has been recognized by friend and foe alike as evidence of our intent to assist our friends and allies in their efforts to remain free.

Today, on the other side of the world from Berlin, we are cooperating with allies by training Vietnamese troops to defend their vital interests.

The decision to deploy the American soldier abroad

is not taken lightly, nor is it regarded lightly by either our friends, who welcome his presence, or by our foes, who find him the greatest obstacle to their plans.

The obstacle to our enemies that the deployment of our battle-ready soldiers in threatened areas represents is both physical and psychological. Its physical properties lie in the soldier's fighting ability—the sum total of his training, his leadership, his equipment, and his dedication. Its psychological properties lie in the soldier's direct relationship to the full array of the nuclear might of America.

This psychological factor becomes more significant in view of the reluctance of the communist leaders to stake their past achievements, and their anticipated future successes, on a nuclear clash with all its incalculable consequences. The limits within which a conventional battle—once launched—can be confined are not known; an attack on the American soldier must always hold a high potential for developing into a nuclear holocaust—one well calculated to be in conflict with communist designs. The forward deployment of the American soldier thus becomes an evident part of our over-all nuclear deterrent—a factor that I believe is fully appreciated by the communists.

You are aware of the Army's plans to reorganize its divisions along what is called the ROAD '65 concept. One of the objectives of the reorganization plan is to increase the protected mobility of our infantry divisions in Europe. Without completely reorganizing at this time, we are moving in that direction by providing 1,000 additional men to each of the three infantry divisions of Seventh Army. This reinforcement will permit Seventh Army to man and maintain an additional number of armored personnel carriers with which they will be provided promptly to improve their mechanized strength. The shipment of personnel and armored personnel carriers to equip these units is under way. The date for the complete reorganization of Seventh Army divisions on the ROAD plan will be determined as influenced by the trend of events.

Relieving our three STRAF divisions of their basic training mission will permit us to double the number

of combat ready divisions in the strategic Army reserve in the United States. Some 50,000 personnel spaces have been added to STRAF to accomplish this expansion. This is a significant improvement. A most essential element of our deployment on global frontiers is a strong and mobile strategic reserve maintained in the United States. The present three-division STRAC force is highly trained, and is highly effective, but it is not large enough to provide an adequate reserve for world-wide commitments. The additional three division forces will enable us to fulfill this mission more satisfactorily.

For modernization in Fiscal Year 1962, the Army is authorized 2.532 billion dollars for weapons, ammunition, and equipment, as compared to the 1.495 billion

dollars authorized for this purpose in Fiscal Year 1961.

It is the responsibility of the Army to insure that the best possible use is made of the resources and of the young American manpower that the nation is providing to obtain a modern Army. We can say, with confidence, that the Army is now in the best position to fulfill this responsibility in its history. After a period of some 20 years of war, and of a precarious peace, the Army has the core of experienced soldiers—both in the active service and in the reserve components—around which we can expand. Our service schools, and our organization for training, are at a high state of efficiency; all the possible steps have been taken in study of concept and doctrine, and in research and development of weapons and equipment. The Army is prepared to employ efficiently the resources now being made available to it.

## **PREPARING FOR THE TOMORROWS**

**By Lt. Gen. BARKSDALE HAMLETT**  
*Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations*

Beyond doubt the situation our nation faces today is a grave one. Many hard decisions must be made and the implementation of these decisions will demand much in the way of hard work, resourcefulness and leadership. However, it is extremely important that today's problems do not detract us from preparing for the trials and problems of tomorrow.

It is clear that the next 10 to 20 years will witness many radical changes which will exert major influence on world affairs. The growth of power in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, increasing ferment in some of the developing nations, a very fluid situation in Africa, accelerated technological advances, a very unstable nuclear balance, and a stronger and more independent Europe all contribute to a changing picture of world power. None of these expected events are necessarily unfavorable to the United States. However, the trends of the times clearly indicate continued U.S. leadership of the free world if it is to shape these trends in a manner favorable to the development of a world order of free societies. The continuing communist threat will necessitate even stronger ties in the collective security effort and our nation must provide the leadership so necessary to weld the several treaty organizations into a bulwark of political and military strength.

Army forces will provide a versatile instrument of military power in influencing conditions. The Army is aware of the challenge that this role presents. It readily accepts this challenge and is confidently developing a blueprint that will provide the strength and the versatility needed to meet the wide range of

conditions that may obtain between now and the 1970's and even thereafter.

Army forces could do much to help the developing nations to help themselves. For example, if requested by the host government development of basic projects such as improved roads and bridges, medical treatment stations, water development and simple communications systems could be initiated by trained U.S. Army units. The indigenous Army forces would be trained concurrently to take over the completion of such projects and for further development of these programs. In areas where civic action programs alone are not enough to strengthen the country, direct support to the military and police forces would assist them in regaining and maintaining internal stability. This support would take the form of training Special Forces and paramilitary units of the host country for counter-terrorist operations and the like. In some regions an airborne brigade task force should be provided if requested by the host government. This force would not necessarily be deployed in the area of operations of the other elements of the task force but would be nearby ready to inject into the area rapidly if need be. This unit would be our guarantee to the developing nations and the Communists that we stand ready and able to back up our friends in maintaining their freedom.

The possibility that local war will flare up in any of the areas of unrest and turmoil will be a constant

## Supporting the Army's Global Missions

threat for many years to come. Suffice it to say, the U.S. must act quickly if these conflagrations are to be brought under control before spreading.

The Army will be prepared to meet this problem in regions where we have deployed forces by the movement of quick reaction units to the particular area concerned. These quick reaction units will be organized and equipped for operations in their particular region. Backing up these quick reaction forces will be the forces in regional reserve. Here again, the units will have the flexibility of organization and equipment to adjust rapidly to meet the situation at hand. They could be employed in a matter of hours either to reinforce the quick reaction units already committed or to go to an area where we do not have troops deployed.

In the United States we will have a strong reserve, strategically mobile, and prepared for ready movement to any trouble spot. This force, which we know today as STRAC, together with Air Force and Navy units, will be a world fire brigade. Elements of this force will be assigned primary missions of being prepared for specific operational areas and their training and equipment will be designed for these particular areas. While these elements will be closely oriented to a particular region, they will have the skills and certain alternate equipment that will enable them to be quickly tailored for action in other areas of the world if the need arises. Although based in the U.S. their tactical training will be largely conducted overseas in conjunction with strategic mobility exercises. These exercises will be held frequently in various parts of the world and with allied forces to enhance combat effectiveness, to gain a good knowledge of the areas concerned and the allied forces with which we might fight, and to demonstrate our capabilities to all.

The remainder of the active forces in the Continental United States as well as selected reserve component forces will be maintained in a high readiness posture for additional reinforcement if necessary. Here again, divisions will be primarily trained and equipped for specific tasks. For example, certain reserve component divisions would be earmarked for operations in Central Europe. They would be highly mechanized and have a wide range of weaponry and ancillary equipment for combat against an enemy with sophisticated military matériel. Key personnel would perform their annual active duty training in the theater in order to become familiar with the area and to keep abreast of local military developments.

Within this concept of having highly trained forces closely oriented to one area but readily adaptable to various environments and prepared to move quickly into action, we can rapidly build up, one force upon the other, to generate with discrimination and precision

the level of strength demanded by the situations encountered.

The threat of general war will continue to hang over us as far as we can see into the future and we intend to be ready for it if it comes. If we are attacked, Army air and missile defense forces will assist in protecting our nation from the initial nuclear exchange while other Army elements render assistance to Civil Defense. Our forces deployed around the world will be heavily engaged, together with our allies, in defending strategic land areas critical to the Free World. In the post-exchange phase the Army will play a major role in gaining control over critical areas and defeating the aggressors.

In furtherance of the foregoing missions, Army forces will be designed for optimum versatility in conducting operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

The division, which will be the basic combat element in the theater commands, by 1970 will be a refinement of the ROAD organization. It will be tailored for its particular region with great stress on tactical mobility. Extensive use will be made of lightly armored vehicles and aerial transport. Its armaments will give it multi-capability and automation will provide for vastly improved surveillance and target acquisition means, rapid fire delivery and simplified administrative and logistical procedures.

Internal flexibility within and between divisions as well as a significant compatibility with the forces of our major allies will optimize the adaptability of the force to rapidly changing tactical environments. We will design this force with great care to insure that it can out-shoot, out-maneuver and out-last any comparable unit that it may be pitted against on the field of battle. Our technology can provide us with the means and we are going to exploit this potential to the maximum.

The Army command in the theaters will be of corps or army size depending upon the requirements of the area. In addition to the combat capabilities of the divisions assigned, each commander will have rockets, missiles and surveillance means that will extend his area of influence much farther than it is today. He will have the means to conduct integrated Army operations — that is, he will be able to coordinate all of the forces that are committed in support of the land battle with the Army elements being the central point of the effort. Sophisticated logistical support equipment will give him the ability to shift his forces rapidly.

The land battle will be characterized by great flexibility regardless of where it is conducted — be it mountain, jungle, desert or plain. Improved munitions will greatly increase the lethality of our firepower and better communications will insure positive control for rapid movement.

Since limited war is far more likely than general

nuclear war, we will put our major emphasis on enhancing our conventional capability. This is not to say that the ability to conduct nuclear operations will be degraded. We have achieved a significant nuclear capability in the Army and we must maintain it in order to be prepared for nuclear war if it does come. However, our most pressing requirement is to achieve a degree of modernity in the non-nuclear field that will give us an appreciably better capability against a modern foe.

By 1970, we plan to have developed the equipment necessary to regain the ability to execute highly mobile operations. This would be done by a combina-

tion of means that would break down the enemy air defenses, enable us to put air power over the enemy's area and then execute quick movements by a combination of air and ground vehicles. We will counter quantitative superiority with qualitative superiority.

Lest the impression be left that we are going to be prepared only to fight a highly modern hostile force, let me say that we recognize that the chances of fighting an enemy with second rate equipment are equally good. Our Army of 1970 will be one with greatly increased operational capabilities that can operate in any area of the world against any foe, regardless of whether he is one with highly sophisticated matériel or the guerrilla with the most primitive of weapons.

## THE LOGISTICS OF MODERNIZATION

By Lt. Gen. ROBERT W. COLGLAZIER, JR.  
*Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics*

When we introduce new items into the Army's inventory we must do it rapidly. If we do not move swiftly the new capability is diluted by the old one. If we move too slowly some of the modern items we buy may become obsolete before the Army is fully equipped with them.

As we modernize our equipment we try to accomplish two non-compatible things simultaneously. First, we try to equip our active Army and the reserve components completely with modern equipment. In addition to this, we try to keep our production lines "hot" so that our production base will be active and able to expand instantly if it becomes necessary for us to mobilize.

The middle ground we have sought to attain has been an inventory adequate to meet the needs of the day, reinforced by production lines which are operating and capable of rapid expansion.

It must be remembered that it takes less time to draft and train a man for combat than it does to change an automatic can opener factory into an automatic rifle plant. The laborious change from one type of manufacturing activity to another is but a first step—the second and even more important step is the actual production of the needed military items in adequate quantities.

I must inject here that this compromise objective has rarely been attained. All too often, our inventory has been inadequate and our production lines have been lukewarm or cold. These dual deficiencies have, in most instances, been caused by inadequate funding.

At this point I want to explain the difference between newness and modernization. There is a significant difference which should be understood—but

often it is not. When we replace, let us say, one of our current trucks with a similar new one we inject newness but not necessarily modernization into the inventory. It is correct to assume that a new truck is better than a worn one; however, this type of replacement only restores a diminished capability—nothing more.

In the not-too-distant past when the country doctor traded his old horse and his sagging buggy for a younger animal and a less worn carriage he gained a little more speed and some additional dependability. When he made this exchange he merely improved his means of transportation, he did not modernize it. In later years when the same doctor replaced his horse and buggy with an automobile he truly modernized his means of transportation and consequently expanded his zone of activity.

A fully equipped modern Army will help prevent a third, and possibly larger, world war. If a third world war does start—and no one can say it won't—we must be equipped to win it on land as well as on the sea or in the air. We must be equipped to win wars of many types—large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear—which might start anywhere in the world at any time.

We constantly strive to improve our land combat capability by procuring the modern equipment our technological know-how enables us to develop. If we do not take advantage of these magnificent technological advancements, we expose our nation to needless and terrible dangers. Furthermore, if we do not adequately equip our Army with modern weapons now,

## Supporting the Army's Global Missions

we must be prepared some day to accept the responsibility for sending our inadequately armed sons to fight an adversary who will be numerically superior and better armed. There are very few people who would knowingly and willingly take these risks or assume such grave responsibilities.

This last statement leads me into the second and equally important reason for rapidly modernizing our inventory. Our principal competitor, and all of you know who he is, has completely re-equipped his army with modern matériel twice since the end of World War II. He has modernized his equipment and he has changed the complexion of his forces.

Hitler was confronted, on his eastern front, by large masses of poorly equipped men, most of whom walked into battle. Those Soviet armies were rather spasmodically and inadequately supplied by a logistic system which moved no faster than the speed of its horse-drawn transport system. Now things are different. Those horse-drawn armies have been replaced by mechanized ones supported by a logistic system which supplements its extensive motor transportation with large fast transport airplanes and heavy lift helicopters.

In this race for matériel supremacy—which is also a race for survival—the competition is keen. We are going to have to move faster and work harder to regain and retain the lead.

One of our greatest assets and a leading source of strength is our industrial capability. Both our industrial capability and our industrial potential exceed that of any other nation. We must capitalize on this tremendous advantage. We have found it profitable to reinforce men with machines in the building of this nation. We must do the same to preserve it.

Many of the modern things we need now have been developed and we are buying some of them; however, our procurement efforts have, in the past, been limited. The types and number of items we buy are governed almost exclusively by the number of dollars we are allotted. Because our procurement rate is tied so securely to money, a price tag has been placed on freedom. Now the question is, "How much—or how little—do we value that freedom?"

We in logistics feel we are more closely associated with industry than any other segment of the Army. This is, of course, only natural for logistics is that essential bridge over which the products flow from the factories to the ultimate consumer on the battlefield. The same as a bridge ties two land masses together, so does logistics bind industry to the battle front. My desire is to widen this bridge and shorten its span.

As time passes, industry and the Army must become even more closely associated with each other. This must be done because our survival as a nation is at stake—one mistake—one error in judgment—or one delay could well be one too many. In this business of national survival, there are no second chances—those who come in second in a war are the losers.

We in DCSLOG are dedicated to the concept that when our troops are mobilized, organized and trained for combat they must also be completely equipped with the most modern matériel our technology can develop and our industry can produce. I am sure all of you are equally dedicated.

The things we need to modernize our Army have been developed. The nation has the industrial capability to produce, and the wealth to pay for all we need. If we combine our assets intelligently we will be safe. If we do less than this, we are reducing our chances of victory and we are gambling with our freedom and the freedoms of generations not yet born.

## **RESEARCH—THE KEY TO TOMORROW**

**By Lt. Gen. ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU**  
*Chief of Research & Development*

Initially, I want to emphasize again the great importance of a threesome which, active at the forefront of scientific advances today, promises for tomorrow undreamed of developments in weapons and equipment. These terrific triplets are: fast-breaking discoveries in the fascinating realm of materials research; soaring advances in the startling sphere of molecular electronics; and revolutionary progress in the creation of new, unique energy sources. We are harnessing and directing these and other research-sparked

phenomena to arm a modern, invincible military force for peace and security for ourselves and all free men.

The mysteries of communication phenomena increasingly have been penetrated, and the outlook for improved command and control devices is excellent. New types of firepower have sprung into being and still greater advances in this field are certain. And, finally, nowhere is the effort of Army R&D more pronounced than in the area which, during this past decade, had so plagued us—mobility. Today, we are exploiting

every conceivable means to accelerate the movement of ground forces over land—through the surf—and in the air.

Moreover, and well known to all of you here, we are moving forward with other new products across the board—medicines, protective clothing, fuels, and foods—to sustain and maintain the individual soldier at any time, any place, and under any condition of warfare.

There can be no doubt in the mind of any citizen and patriot concerned today with the critical question of international peace that research and development—in its broader sense, the wondrous twain of science and technology—is vital to a victorious forward strategy for a mighty America. How well we employ them in meeting the military challenge—in paramilitary warfare—in conventional warfare—in nuclear warfare—from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force—will determine the extent to which our way of life will bless this earth.

In this regard, all of our people—in all walks of life—throughout these 50 United States—must resolutely resist those disciples of despair who crawl around the cocktail lounges, corner drug stores and country clubs selling us short with scientific shibboleths. They will never find a substitute for the fighting heart of a man or a nation.

Certainly, modern science is exploding on all fronts, bringing to this generation a future as awesome as it is promising.

All fields in the physical, life and social sciences are changing today—and changing rapidly; so rapidly, indeed, that it tests our judgment to employ the great scientific advances wisely.

For this nation, I envision greater opportunity than at any period in our glorious past if we but dare to seek it. But we must be ever-ready, constantly on the *qui vive*, and always aware of the need to test the nuance against the patent key of the future.

Today America can use its tremendous scientific and technological progress to counter and control, to meet and beat, the most vicious challenge of this millennium—the challenge of Godless communism—a cancer that seeks to agonize and destroy life, liberty and happiness.

It was Napoleon over 140 years ago who said—and his words were later reinforced by Marshal Foch—"The commander who holds on and fights for the last quarter of an hour usually wins the battle." We must never forget these words. We must always keep firm our determination, as a people and as a nation. Unfortunately, Napoleon forgot his own advice once—and this was at Waterloo.

Our President has laid down the guide lines and our people have certainly responded magnificently to his support these last few weeks. We need his kind of leadership; he needs this kind of support. To maintain it to meet the challenge that lies ahead, we need a strong, moral adrenalin. Brinkmanship is always a hazard—but brinkmanship arises because there is a hazard. Still, I am not as afraid of *brinkmanship* as I am of what may be called *shrinkmanship*—the tendency to shrink from the duty to stand up to the things which we know are right.

As we look today to science and technology to provide us with the new knowledge and techniques from which we can devise new weapons and equipment, we must also look more closely at our adversary. Forewarned of enemy capabilities, we must keep ahead in the technological race.

In planning our R&D efforts, we are guided by two principles:

First of all, our R&D program must be compatible with the long-range objectives of the Army.

Second, we must be constantly aware that, in order to achieve our objectives, we must increase and improve our planning and coordination with industry and with our educational and scientific institutions.

The Army today is spending more than one billion dollars a year on research and development—over a tenth of the entire Army budget. Of this, about two hundred million goes into basic and applied research—the other eight hundred million plus, goes for development, testing and evaluation.

Without a dynamic research program, qualitative superiority in weapons and equipment would be impossible to maintain. Research provides the foundation for our developmental projects.



GEN. DECKER



GEN. HAMLETT



GEN. COLGLAZIER



GEN. TRUDEAU

## THE ARMY'S GLOBAL FRONTIERS

To support national military policy the U. S. Army has a host of difficult assignments, requiring many flexible, diversified, combat, combat support and logistical units

1 Many fine graphic aids were used at the AUSA meeting. From them ARMY chose a few in an effort to tell in simplified form the Army's missions and needs



3 The world-wide commitments of the U.S. require an Army strong enough to fight in all parts of the world



5 Forward-deployed forces—east or west, north or south—require modernly equipped, battle-trained troops



2 U. S. military forces must maintain dual-capable units able to wage nuclear or non-nuclear war




4 All U. S. units must be tailored to the requirements of the ground they may fight on



6 Behind the forward-deployed units must be a powerful reserve force—STRAC—with ready air and sea mobility



7 Behind STRAC is STRAF—units of the active and reserve components—ready to move fast and in force



8 An important Army task is the military assistance and advice provided to other forces of the free world



9 The troops of USAREUR are closer to the true source of communist power—Moscow—than any other U. S. forces



11 Within the NATO area flows the lifeblood of modern industry and beats the heart of western civilization



10 U. S. Army combat and logistics forces in France, Germany and Italy face the Iron Curtain



12 Battle readiness is the key to the élan of a force that knows its potential enemy is not far away

## THE PACIFIC-ASIA FRONTIER

Vast differences, complex and difficult missions, involving relationships with eager, but untrained, people of underdeveloped nations, give the United States Army, Pacific, highly challenging tasks

**13** Immense distances and difficult terrain magnify the problems of the Pacific Asia frontier



**15** Hard up against the bamboo curtain U. S. military forces stand ready, train others, and provide essential services




**17** On the UN-Red China truce line, U. S. and Red Chinese soldiers stand with weapons loaded and ready


MILITARY POWER IS THE BACKBONE OF FREE WORLD STRENGTH IN ASIA



**14** The non-military problems of Asia are tremendous but military force provides the secure environment that will permit them to be solved



**16** The world of Southeast Asia is a world of guerrillas and guerrilla controlled villages and plantations



**18** The logistics of the Pacific-Asian frontier boggle the imagination: From Pusan to San Francisco a mere 5,000 miles

## THE DEFENSE OF FREE EUROPE

By Gen. BRUCE C. CLARKE  
*Commanding General, U. S. Army, Europe*

We of the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), are responsible for carrying out and executing national aims purely within the scope and meaning of those treaties and agreements which are consummated by our national governments.

The principal mission of USAREUR is to support NATO. Within the framework of NATO, USAREUR maintains on the continent of Europe a combat ready field army, fully trained and equipped. Its job, in cooperation with the other NATO forces, is the defense of Free Europe. Should an aggressor attack, USAREUR would be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

We are fully aware of the vital importance of our defense mission. The part that Western Europe plays in the present and future world can hardly be over-emphasized. The area defended by NATO is without doubt the most valuable piece of real estate in Europe. It contains the huge Ruhr and Saar industrial complexes—vast mineral deposits, farms, port facilities and waterways, communications and commercial facilities whose combined potential staggers the imagination. A mere recital of the names of some of the cities the area embraces—London, Paris, Brussels, Rotterdam, Frankfurt, Rome—gives an indication of the wealth and importance of the region.

In western hands, the great assets of this region are contributing to world peace and prosperity. Their loss to communist hands could mean the collapse and death of Europe—perhaps of the entire Free World.

It is my conviction that the man who will spell the difference between these two alternatives—a free Europe or a communist Europe—is the ground combat soldier. He is our paramount concern in USAREUR.

He is the focal point of all our efforts. Our role is to equip, train, sustain, and support him so that he can do his job. This role is equally significant in any kind of war—hot or cold. It is just as important in general war as in limited war.

I cannot praise highly enough the untiring work, the devotion, the courage, of the officers and men of the Seventh Army. There isn't time here to go into all of the accomplishments of the Seventh in Europe. But I should like to make mention of one of its special elements which may be of particular interest to you. This is the armored cavalry regiments which serve as a kind of border patrol along the free side of the Iron Curtain. There is no need to remind the men of these units of the threat of communism. They live with it day in, day out. They are well aware that on the success of their mission depends the security of Europe—and of the United States and the rest of the Free World. They typify the Seventh Army.

Then, there is the U.S. garrison in West Berlin. The men of this unit are also intimate with the threat of communism. They are surrounded by it. They see it every day, across the narrow sector lines of this divided city, through the arches of the great Brandenburg Gate. This garrison in West Berlin is a symbol of America's determination to stand up to the communist threat, to carry out U.S. responsibilities in Berlin, to keep West Berlin free.

Behind the great area of responsibility of the Seventh Army and the important garrison of Berlin and stretching from the Rhine to French seaports on the Atlantic, is the United States Army Communications Zone. COMZ's mission is to supply the forward com-



Gen. KLEYSER

Gen. CLARKE

Gen. BOWEN

Gen. PRIEUR

Gen. ROSATO

bat troops in Germany with the matériel—the guns, tanks, food and fuel—they need to do their job. This mission is of equal importance with our defense and combat missions.

COMZ has been performing logistic functions for units in West Germany for over a decade. During this time it has developed into one of the most rapid, efficient supply systems ever devised. Any war would find COMZ ready to roll.

Looking to the south of Europe—to Italy—we come to the fourth principal element of the United States Army, Europe—the Southern European Task Force or SETAF. SETAF has been in operation since 1955, when Austria became a neutral country and U.S. troops were withdrawn from its territory. It is unique among U.S. Army commands in that its primary reason for existence is the support of the land forces of another nation—the NATO forces of Italy. It is, first and foremost, a missile command. In time of war, it would furnish missile and other support to Italian ground forces.

Here again we find U.S. troops working closely with European troops. This international character of the defense of Western Europe cannot be overemphasized. Men of the NATO forces work, train, and live together in close cooperation. There are French and German troops working right alongside American soldiers in my own headquarters.

This cooperation is underlined by NATO programs to standardize allied military procedure, weapons and equipment. USAREUR plays a role here too, in support of a general program of the United States to help our Allies to help themselves. USAREUR provides logistic and training support to some of the military missions working with the armies of our Allies, instructing them in the use of modern weapons and in modern battlefield tactics. To the classrooms of USAREUR's several service schools come officers and men from all branches of the armed forces of our NATO Allies. This technical and educational assistance is an investment in security. We are confident that whatever help we can give our Allies will be repaid us many times over.

This leads to the subject of training. USAREUR is well aware that how well we fight tomorrow, should we be called upon to do so, depends on how well we train today. The combat units of USAREUR are almost continually in the field. Exercises in our Communications Zone test the speed and efficiency with which we can get supplies and equipment from boats docked at French ports to front-line combat units. Tactical training runs the gamut from qualification in individual weapons to practice firing of atomic-capable missiles; from small-unit field problems to participation in multi-national NATO exercises. These multi-



- TO PLAY YOUR PART ON THE NATO TEAM.
- TO HELP MAINTAIN THE PEACE BY BEING CONSTANTLY COMBAT READY.
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national NATO exercises are an encouraging thing to view. The barriers to international military cooperation which you might imagine would exist—such things as language differences and differences in national military procedure—are minimized when the NATO armies get together in joint headquarters and in the field. I must say that if I were a Soviet leader, I would be more than a little upset by the efficiency and smoothness with which these exercises go off.

Thus far, I have been talking about defense and combat, and preparation for it. I should like to go on now to what seems to me to be another of the general aims of the United States in Europe: to create and maintain friendship and understanding between America and those nations with which we are associated in the cause of freedom. The United States Army, Europe plays an important role in support of this aim also. We consider our mission to further good community relations abroad as second only to that of combat readiness.

The average American soldier and the members of his family are born salesmen for our country abroad. The American soldier is a familiar sight on the streets, in the shops, in public places of countless foreign communities. To the average citizen of our host countries in Europe, he represents America. I believe he's doing a fine job in this role of unofficial ambassador.

I am not alone in this belief. The European people generally feel the same way. A Gallup-affiliated poll taken only a few months ago showed that the Germans, for example, show increasing approval of the conduct of American troops in their country.

There you have in brief the role of the United States Army in supporting our national aims in Europe. But we of USAREUR are concerned that the members of our command *also* know the role they play in world affairs. To this end, we conduct an extensive troop information program designed to tell the soldier why he is in Europe, what his mission is there, and to inform him about the potential enemy he faces.

## REPORT FROM GERMANY

By **Brig. Gen. CARL C. KLEYSER**  
*West German Army*

In 1959 we began to reorganize the German Army on the basis of the brigade concept. This reorganization was carried out with the objective of adapting our forces to the technological conditions existing on the modern battlefield and achieving a greater battlefield mobility for all of our troops. Through this reorganization our Army has been given the capability to operate in conventional as well as nuclear battle. And, due to its high combat potential and its organizational structure, including organic logistical support elements, each brigade is capable of sustaining operations for several days without outside support, if necessary.

Our brigades are organized in peacetime in accordance with their wartime order of battle. This is undoubtedly a great asset for the uniformity of training and command procedures. You are probably aware of the fact that we make a distinction between two basic types of brigades which are organized along similar lines. Each brigade also has a certain number of specialized units and organic logistical support elements which make them logically self-supporting for a period of three to five days. These brigades have only conventional weapons. Advanced dual purpose weapons are not to be found below division and corps level. These brigades can be attached to divisions of any type and in any given combination in accordance with the situation, command intentions and terrain conditions.

## REPORT FROM FRANCE

By **Brig. Gen. ROBERT P. PRIEUR**  
*French Army*

We are thinking in terms of a battle force stationed partly in France, partly in the Federal Republic of Germany, built around the tactical atomic weapon, and capable of action in a nuclear war as well as in the classical kind of limited conflict.

This battle force, limited in size but kept always at full strength would be ready to take the field at a moment's notice. Equipped with the most recent matériel possible, it would possess: atomic capability; target intelligence and exploitation systems; ground and air, such as special reconnaissance troops, drones, radars, helicopters and so forth; fire elements capable of maneuvering under the conditions of atomic warfare (this implies protection against radiation and a high degree of mobility); and medium and low altitude antiaircraft defenses.

Units should be so organized as to permit them to fight in an extremely confused situation; this assumes that the combined arms principle will be applied at a relatively low echelon.

It may be deduced that the studies now being made on the basis of these principles with the help of war gaming teams, will lead to the concept of a square division, light in strength

(less than 10,000 men) and possessing considerable firepower, very great mobility and important logistical autonomy.

In addition to this battle force, which will remain shoulder-to-shoulder with the NATO Forces in Europe, the French Army will also comprise a small but strong airborne and amphibious force, immediately able to fight overseas when needed and other units with the mission of forestalling or stopping any outbreak of subversion in metropolitan France or in Algeria. These latter forces, greater in number, but requiring only the familiar conventional armament, could be made up of a few regular elements, along with many reserve units which in case of emergency could be rapidly called up and engaged through a very decentralized mobilization system.

All these projects, especially those concerning the battle force, can be brought to fruition only at the cost of a great effort of modernization of equipment.

## REPORT FROM ITALY

By **Maj. Gen. UMBERTO ROSATO**  
*Italian Army*

The major Italian Army units may be classified into two main groups: those forces which are allocated to NATO and those forces which are for national missions. The forces allocated to NATO are grouped under a single field army command with its army corps. Included are infantry and armored divisions, alpine brigades and certain support units. All of these forces are kept at a high level of readiness and combat strength.

Some of them, specifically the infantry divisions, have recently undergone radical reorganizations. These reorganizations were accomplished as the results of studies and tests and the reorganization will enable them to operate both under atomic and conventional warfare conditions. Additionally their mobility characteristics under the topographical features of the terrain in which they will be expected to operate have been greatly improved.

The Italian Army today has two types of infantry divisions. First, a normal or flat terrain type of division which has a high degree of mobility, flexibility and reactive power, and the mountain divisions which have been specifically organized and designated for operation in rugged and mountainous terrain.

Among the support units, special mention must be made of SETAF, or the Southern European Task Force. SETAF is indeed an Allied unit which has both an American missile command equipped with CORPORAL and an Italian missile command equipped with HONEST JOHN. This command has the mission of providing fire support for the Italian forces deployed in the northeastern sector of defense. In peacetime, operational control of all forces allocated to NATO is exercised by LAND-SOUTH. And, in case of an emergency, command of these forces is the responsibility of LAND-SOUTH Headquarters. Thus, LAND-SOUTH Headquarters is responsible for the employment of SETAF.

## MIDDLE EAST: STRATEGY AND OIL

By Maj. Gen. FRANK S. BOWEN, JR.  
*Deputy Commander in Chief, NELM*

That portion of the Middle East area with which the Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) deals includes the countries of the Middle East lying to the east of Libya and south of Turkey, Russia and Communist China; west of Burma and southeast Asia; and includes the waters of the Arabian and Red Seas, the Persian Gulf and part of the Bay of Bengal. It extends some 4400 miles from east to west and 2400 miles from north to south and is over twice the size of the Continental United States.

One might ask why we have an interest in and are concerned over this part of the world. There are two simple answers: strategic location and oil. Geographically, the Middle East is the hub of the Eastern Hemisphere. History seems to demonstrate that anyone who would long dominate the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere must, as an essential step, dominate the Middle East. Conversely, for anyone trying to resist continental expansion, the Middle East must be protected at all costs. It is truly the bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Russia traditionally has sought to establish some measure of control in the Middle East by expansion southward and westward. Such an extension is important to her, not only because of the strategic importance of the area lying as it does on her southern flank, and the eastern and southern flank of NATO, but also because the area offers her a direct outlet to the warm waters of the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The objectives of Soviet Russia in this matter do not differ from those of the Czars. However, the Soviets have added the additional insidious twist of internal subversion to their means of meeting their objectives. With the emergence of the so-called uncommitted nations of Africa, the Soviets have a new reason for desiring a dominant role in the Middle East.

In addition to its strategic location, the Middle East contains three-quarters of the world's known oil resources. The region is currently producing between one-fourth and one-third of the world's total output. Our allies in Western Europe are dependent upon this region for their supply. While the Russians may have

no vital need of Middle East oil for their own use, it would certainly be of tremendous advantage to them to be able to control its production and exportation.

These, then, are the strategic problems we find in the Middle East. What are our national aims in this area?

We must assist the people of the Middle East in their efforts to resist domination by a totalitarian power whose aims and policies are inimicable to the free world of which they are a part, and we must insure that Middle East oil is available to our allies. We must do everything in our power to prevent the spread of communism to the area, regardless of the form it might take.

In support of free world interests, U. S. policy has been, as all of you know, to promote peace, understanding, and economic stability in the Middle East in order to insure its continued neutrality or alignment with the nations of the West. We endeavor to do this primarily through diplomatic channels and with economic and military aid programs. However, direct military support may be provided at the request of nations who may find themselves in difficulty. Our commitment to Lebanon was just such a case.

In considering our problems and the problems of the indigenous governments within the Middle East we should first examine briefly the sociological, political and geographical aspects of the area.

As you well know, the Middle East has been the seat of some of our oldest civilizations and cultures. They have known the yoke of many oppressors which causes them to look with suspicion on so-called foreigners, and this includes, in many cases, the U. S. as well as the USSR. They are a fierce, proud group who, for the most part, have known little but poverty and hard work. They resent exploitation and have become very nationalistic minded. This tide is now rising and running full. With this rise, boundary and sovereignty disputes take on a new importance as a source of friction and potential trouble. From the U. S. stand-

point, how are we to provide assistance that does not take on the taint of helping brother against brother?

Their military forces—a major factor in what little stability does exist in the area—while improving in capability, are deficient in many respects. All nations are dependent upon the major powers for their arms and heavy equipment. None has any significant logistic capability. Most are short on training and technical ability. The high illiteracy rate in many areas makes improvement in these latter areas a long-range proposition.

Each nation's forces are designed primarily to preserve internal security and to provide some measure of defense against incursions from its neighbors. It is our estimate that the indigenous forces throughout the area are generally capable of doing just that.

The basic problems that confront the friendly indigenous governments and ourselves are difficult and most complex. They can, however, be summarized succinctly.

The Middle East is best described as an area of marked instabilities. These instabilities arise from:

- (1) The economically and socially unsatisfied groups which are fertile ground for breeding discontent and dissension.
- (2) Remaining long-standing rivalries and jealousies among several of the tribes and peoples within the Middle East.
- (3) The "growing pains" of nationalism with attendant anti-foreigner manifestations.
- (4) The varying degrees of experience among governing elements and personalities.
- (5) The internal struggles for power and the tendency toward revolutionary actions.
- (6) Communist penetrations in the area.
- (7) And, finally, the long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute to which no real solution is yet foreseen.

The military geography of the Middle East must be understood. Along the northern Indian border are found the Himalayas, perhaps the most formidable mountain terrain to be found anywhere. Joining the Himalayas in northern Pakistan and extending across northern Afghanistan are the Hindu Kush Mountains, which in turn join the Elbruz Mountains that parallel the northern border of Iran. The elevation of this mountainous area varies in height from about 25,000 feet in the Himalayas to about 10,000 feet in the Elbruz Mountains in northern Iran. These mountains are a formidable barrier to north-south movement. There are very few corridors or avenues of access oriented in a north-south fashion. It should be stressed that cross-country movement for vehicles in this mountain region is virtually impossible throughout the year, and cross-country movement for foot troops is extremely difficult.

Just to the south of the northern mountain barrier

of the Middle East is a narrow belt of foothill type terrain that extends from India laterally across the area to Syria. This foothill belt is generally open, rolling type terrain in which cross-country movement and conventional military operations of all sorts are quite possible. Moving further to the south and comprising the vast majority of the geography in the Middle East is either flat plains terrain or desert terrain. The plains terrain covers most of India, while there are major desert regions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. As is well known, the Saudi Arabia peninsula is the largest continuous sand desert in the world.

Much of the military geography of Egypt is also desert. The special demands that the desert places on operations impose even more stress on the equipment and arms that the individual soldier would carry with him into combat. The sand has a very abrasive effect on equipment and, therefore, maintenance in the desert region represents a considerable problem. To operate in a desert region, it would be necessary to utilize equipment which is adapted to desert type operations and it would be preferable to use troops that have a knowledge of this type of operations.

Moving further south in the Middle East, another formidable mountain barrier exists in Ethiopia and this mountain range tends to separate the desert terrain to the north from the African jungle terrain to the south. Moving to the extreme southern portion of the Middle East, southern Somalia, southern Ethiopia, and the southern Sudan, African bush-type country is to be encountered.

Superimposed on the demanding and difficult terrain that has just been described is a very rudimentary transportation system. There are not too many roads and railroads and those that do exist are not first-class transportation facilities as we know them in the United States. A particular characteristic is that the needs of each of the individual countries in the Middle East are barely satisfied by these rather rudimentary transportation systems. The biggest weakness in the Middle East transportation system, as a whole, is that no effective link has been established between adjacent countries. Lateral movement across the Middle East would be rather difficult due to this inadequacy.

Weather and climate vary in extremes which magnify the problems of military operations. In the northern mountain region, the winter months are extremely cold and for a period of about two months there is heavy snowfall. So much, in fact, that the few corridors and key mountain passes are completely blocked, making movement—even on foot—virtually impossible. Spring thaws cause many of the roads to be washed out and the entire area to be extremely wet.

The climate in the desert regions becomes particularly uncomfortable in the summer months due to

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high temperatures and lack of water. It is not at all uncommon for daytime temperatures to reach 120 degrees, and the nighttime temperatures to drop down to the 60s.

The means of meeting our objectives in this area lie primarily in the political and economic fields, and I need not mention that our efforts in both fields are extremely active and prominent. However, backing up these programs is a substantial military effort beginning with our participation in economic military aid programs in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia; our programs in support of the Central Treaty Organization and, finally, our readiness to provide direct support to friendly indigenous governments at their request in time of need.

The armed forces in the area are primarily ground forces as their mission is almost entirely internal security. The U.S. Army, through MAAGs and Missions and other Military Aid Programs, has, therefore, played a substantial role in the security of the Middle East. That these programs have been as successful as they have under the handicaps they face is a great commentary on the ability and dedication of the individual members of our country teams.


Many of these countries lack the capacity or the economic ability to meet even minimum deterrent requirements and it is a vital U.S. interest to continue and improve our military aid program to them.

U.S. support of CENTO needs very little amplification. The U.S. needs no incentive to support regional groups that are united in a common cause to resist aggression. Beyond our military aid programs, our bilateral security treaties with the regional member nations of CENTO are a further guarantee of our direct and continuing interest in this area.

This brings me to direct U.S. assistance when requested. Again I want to emphasize that the initial effort and incentive must be of indigenous origin. Under this concept our problems, while enormous, are manageable.

Our first and major concern is the fact that no U.S. forces, other than the MAAGs and Missions, are stationed in the area. The forces required in adequate strength, fire power and logistic support must come by air and sea from Europe, the United States and the Pacific. This is no easy task when we are planning in terms of 2400 air miles from Europe and 6800 air miles from the U.S. Shipping distances from Europe through the Suez are 6700 miles. If we cannot use the Suez, it is 12,000 miles from either Norfolk or Bremenhaven via the Cape of Good Hope, and the same distance from San Francisco via the Pacific.

For any kind of defense against aggression, a short reaction time, following the political decision to inter-



*Oil life lines of the world stem from Middle East—geographical hub of Eastern Hemisphere.*

vene, will be critical to the success of the venture. This reaction time is controlled by these tremendous time and space factors in the movement of adequate forces to do the job.

I have mentioned the availability of the Suez. Air route, overflight and staging rights must also be obtained. This in itself is time consuming, and in the end such rights may be refused by some countries. This could result in movement over greater distances and a requirement for additional staging and support bases.

The requirements to lift adequate Army airborne forces over great distances and to provide them with logistic support by air until surface lines of communication can be established is an airlift problem of enormous proportion when weighed against any previous standards. It has to be met if we are to meet our commitments. We cannot accept too little or too late.

One other aspect of our entry into the area is of major importance in meeting our airlift requirements. Minimum altitudes over critical air routes approach 16,000 feet. At that altitude our personnel transports must be pressurized. The older types of aircraft can be employed only for logistic support.

This area of the world is of great strategic importance to the free world, if individual liberty and freedom are to survive. It needs our understanding and assistance in the solution of its internal and external problems. And it needs, most of all, our assurance that U.S. support, in whatever form and strength it may be required, will be available if, when, and where required.

The Army's role in this program differs little from its role in any other part of the world. The only differences are in the complications and magnitude of the tasks. Today we are not there in great numbers, but in our assistance programs even those small numbers are doing a job of such import it needs our maximum support in and out of the Army.

If greater support is required, we must be ready and capable of providing it.

## DEFENSE PROBLEMS OF PACIFIC-ASIA

By Gen. JAMES F. COLLINS  
*Commanding General, U. S. Army, Pacific*

As Army component commander in the Pacific Command, my area of responsibility for Army operations coincides with the over-all area of CINCPAC's unified command responsibility. In general terms, this area extends from the Arctic to the Antarctic and from California to India.

Since most Americans have a better picture of the Atlantic and Europe than of the Pacific and Asia, I have prepared some comparative figures. Travelling across the Atlantic from New York to London only takes you half way from San Francisco to Saigon. Such tremendous ocean distances have a major impact upon military strategy.

However, the vast water distances are only part of the story. Land makes up a considerable portion of this theater—an important portion because it is on the land that today's battles are being fought. Some of this land area is still free; some of it is occupied by the enemy. We think of France as large. Actually, France fits inside Manchuria, a part of China. In fact, West Europe fits easily into East Asia.

Pacific-Asia has over a billion people, a third of world population. Pacific-Asia constitutes over 12 million square miles of world land area. Asia contains only a small portion of world industry.

Let us look for a moment at the threat we face. Red China today is in a circumstance which in history has almost inevitably led to aggression: exploding population, food shortages, arrogant dictatorship, and vulnerable states at her borders.

For many years—long before communism—Russia threatened world peace as she pushed out alternately east and west. For almost a century, the United States worked with the Chinese people as Russia sought to absorb parts of their country. Now, however, we have not only Russia but also a belligerent Red China to contend with in Asia.

Some would have us believe this is primarily an ideological competition in which military strength is a minor element. Others properly recognize, however, that the battle in Asia is primarily a power struggle with the enemy conducting military operations under an ideological frosting. Power requires military strength and the will to use that strength in defense of national interests.

Clausewitz once described war as "the continuation of politics by other means." That was a day when it was easier to define the point at which politics ended and war started. However, if I may paraphrase Clausewitz a little, the communists view peace as the continuation of war by all other means—with overt warfare just around the corner. Their military strength just around the corner and their paramilitary strength committed to battle play the major role.

It is difficult for Asians to distinguish between democracy and communism. As an Asian friend succinctly stated, "The enemy portrays communism in terms of rice; you picture democracy in terms of votes. The average Asian can eat rice but does not yet know what to do with votes."

The communists in Asia have considerable military strength to back their ambitions. Red China has a large army equipped with much post-World War II equipment. She is exporting military and paramilitary strength to North Korea, North Vietnam, North Laos, and now to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

However, Red China is not 12 feet tall. A good portion of China's power is will and determination. There are many weaknesses in the logistical and economic areas. China has mass; but massive numbers have been defeated before by smaller but more technically advanced nations working for a just goal.

What, then, is our military concept for countering this threat to our national interests in Pacific-Asia? The basic essential is a "forward strategy" and a forward strategy requires modernized army strength with a careful balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities.

This is true whether we are thinking in terms of



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cold, limited, or unlimited wars. I do not intend to compartmentalize my discussion into separate concepts for each of these categories of warfare as is often done because, in so doing, one tends to lose sight of the overlaps and to confuse the grey areas. Actually, a key element of cold war is being prepared for all hotter degrees. Besides, current Army operations are part and parcel of what I consider "forward strategy."

Forward strategy means to me that the U. S. actively deters aggression in forward areas and is prepared to punish aggression with military power where it occurs.

Unfortunately, until there is a guarantee that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will not pursue its goals in Asia by military and paramilitary means, the Free World will have to maintain in Asia an array of military power tailored to the threat and the anticipated operational environment. The nature of today's threat to Asia and the over-all world political environment places a premium on Free World army strength in Pacific-Asia land areas.

I visualize this army strength as deployed in three echelons:

First, forward-area forces consisting primarily of indigenous army strength but reinforced by U. S. Army units in appropriate areas.

Second, a theater mobile-army-striking-force with air and sea transportation reasonably available to move it expeditiously to any of several forward areas. This would be primarily U. S. but would include allied elements as can be made available.

Third, the U. S. Army strategic reserve—or STRAC—located in CONUS with air and sea transportation reasonably available to move it expeditiously to any of several theaters.

I want to stress two essential requirements: the importance of our military assistance program and the necessity for some forward deployment of U. S. Army forces.

Allied armies are the backbone element of the forward-area outpost system. Their military strength is the *sine qua non* of a forward strategy. Our strength is their strength; their strength is our strength. U. S. responsibilities under the Mutual Security Program are a desirable manifestation of our world leadership.

Militarily, U. S. tasks in Asia can be facilitated or complicated dependent on our allies. Our MAAG's made considerable progress with Asian armies in the past 10 years.

We sometimes underestimate the part that Army personnel can play in the over-all development of our Asian friends.

Army technicians—engineer, quartermaster, ordnance, signal—are daily training Asians in skills and occupations important to both military and civilian life. While in the Army, these indigenous technicians

participate in civic action projects. Ultimately, they return to the civilian economy with their technical skills and knowledge. In Asia, they become the leavening in the bread, the nucleus of a slowly growing and badly needed force of skilled indigenous labor.

Further, Army personnel in the MAAG's have an opportunity to implement a people-to-people program on a man-to-man basis. They are present in numbers. They are spread around the country in hamlets and villages, not primarily in the capital. They are in intimate contact with a cross section of the people in the officers, NCO's and men with whom they deal daily. They are in an ideal situation not only to create friends but also to develop leaders—real leaders if we do it correctly—who can guide their countrymen forward to true democracy, freedom, and progress.

MAAG Army personnel are doing a tremendous job. We must find ways of developing their potential further.

The second point to be stressed is the necessity in Pacific-Asia for forward deployment of U. S. Army forces. In essence, we just couldn't get all we need onto the battlefield in time to do any good if we had to start with *all* our forces in the U. S. However, there is also another side to this coin.

Because of the psychological and political circumstances in Asia, the U. S. must give tangible evidence that it is not only able to fight but also willing to fight by the side of our free allies. In view of Red China's need for more room, additional food, and new successes to divert the attention of her people from their misery, Red China can be expected to exploit any indication of lack of capability or lack of willingness on our part. The U. S. must not only be firm but, equally important, must appear firm. The most clear-cut way we can do this is by forward deployment of the U. S. Army.

Forward deployment means some Army forces on frontier locations as Korea and other Army elements within the Pacific area—a theater mobile-army-striking-force—ready to move in advance of STRAC to reinforce our allies as necessary.

This brings me to one of the more perplexing problems facing military leaders today. What is the proper balance between nuclear and nonnuclear military requirements?

In operational planning we stress enemy capabilities not intentions. The Sino-Soviet enemy is capable of nonnuclear, tactical nuclear, and massive nuclear attacks. The U. S. can maintain the peace in Asia and deter enemy aggression only by having the capability of countering each of these enemy possibilities as necessary to achieve victory—if war comes.

On strategic nuclear capability, I have only two observations which are particularly material to our concept for Pacific-Asia.

The first concerns the credibility of a nuclear deter-

rent. Korea, Dien Bien Phu, Laos are facts that diminish the credibility of massive nuclear retaliation as a deterrent to non-nuclear aggression in Asia. In my opinion, aggression in Asia can be deterred only by a credible conventional deterrent. This means obvious Army strength, U. S. and allied, and positive action to make it credible.

These forces, nevertheless, must have a nuclear capability on the ground. To be fully effective, the Pacific Army's posture must continue to include modern mobile tactical nuclear delivery systems as well as modern conventional systems which can be deployed as the situation warrants.

While we cannot rule out the possibility of nuclear war in Pacific-Asia, we also should not underestimate the likelihood of conventional wars. Limited wars for limited objectives with limited risks are a classic communist tactic. Conventional wars between the Free World and the same enemy have been continuous in Asia since before 1945. Although the complexion of these wars has varied a little, a key factor in each has

been the non-nuclear military and paramilitary capabilities of the opposing sides. Some have referred to this theater as the "limited war theater." We should not go that far, as such a term excludes the ever-present possibility, however remote, of nuclear war in Asia. However, the connotation that non-nuclear operations have been and probably will be the paramount characteristic of war in Pacific-Asia is valid.

In summary, there are four main points. First, U. S. interests dictate a forward strategy for Pacific-Asia. Second, to be effective, this forward strategy must include continued development of allied military forces and forward deployment of U. S. Army units. Third, a strong conventional capability, in-being and ready, is essential to deter—and, if necessary to punish—enemy aggression in Asia. Fourth, the nature of the enemy and the terrain dictate that, in Pacific-Asia, Army forces must play a major role, under both hot and cold war conditions, if victory is to be assured.

## OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC-ASIA

By Maj. Gen. W. PAUL JOHNSON  
G3, U. S. Army Pacific

In Pacific-Asia there is extensive area to defend and, relatively, limited army forces. The Communists have superior numbers and are operating on interior lines. Further, we cannot determine in advance with certainty where they will next strike in force. The "school solution" for this type of situation at tactical echelons would be a mobile defense. Before World War II mobile defense was called the "offensive-defense," which term is most descriptive of its basic nature. It is the opposite of a Maginot Line concept. Instead of stationing a majority of available forces on a main line of resistance as in position defense, forward

areas are lightly held and the main strength is retained in reserve ready to move rapidly wherever and whenever an enemy attacks. Is this form of defense applicable to our situation in Pacific-Asia?

The basic concept is pertinent: building a Maginot

Line along the Bamboo Curtain would be neither effective nor practical. The general principles are appropriate: their emphasis on flexibility and mobility is suited to the vastness of the area and the fluid nature of the situation.

Because of the intervening ocean area in the Pacific-Asia area, Navy ships must take the place of trucks and Air Force transports must take the place of Army helicopters to gain mobility. Nevertheless, predesignation and prior planning and rehearsals are still essential—even more so. While they should not sit idle awaiting the whistle, units to be responsible for this transportation must be designated and have the specific mission of assembling at striking force locations on very short notice.

To facilitate movement planning, we would ideally locate our theater mobile army striking force in one central location. However, the transportation available and the distances involved are such that some elements and some supplies should be deployed further forward. The major U. S. portion should be centrally located as in Hawaii. Other U. S. elements and supplies can be situated just outside the forward battle area as in Okinawa. Depending upon political factors and



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## The vast reaches of Pacific-Asia

intergovernmental mutual defense agreements, allied elements might be added to the theater mobile army striking force. If imminence of attack increases, it might be necessary to push additional U. S. elements forward, reconstituting our theater mobile army striking force as necessary from CONUS.

The vastness of this theater complicates logistics even more than tactical movements. Fighting troops require supplies—food, ammunition, replacement equipment—whether they are Navy, Marine, Air Force, or Army. We could meet this logistical requirement either by air lifting supplies with our striking force tactical elements—thus, more aircraft or less combat troops—or by establishing caches in forward areas as the Arctic prospectors did. The latter is obviously the better solution.

Thus, there are degrees to the forward deployment and these are both tactical and logistical aspects. The division in Hawaii is forward deployed in one sense. Our forces on Okinawa are further forward but still a part of the theater mobile army striking force. Divisions in Korea, on the other hand, are not fully available for immediate redeployment as a striking force; therefore, they are primarily initial contact forces.

U. S. MAAG's and MAP are an essential part of free world efforts to achieve military security and internal law and order. This is a tremendous but invaluable task, training and supplying Allied armies. But this is only a part of the mission of our "in-country" forces. The second function of these forces is to execute maximum delay pending arrival of the striking force reinforcements and to hold maximum terrain to provide maneuvering room for the counter-offensive force—our general reserve. Thus, more than a "trigger force" is needed.

There has to be adequate strength to preclude a friendly country being overrun before the free world can react. Under present conditions, this mission would require reinforcing the gradually improving allied military forces with U. S. Army elements in key locales.

An important factor in determining how many and what type of U. S. and allied forces would be needed is the over-all anticipated operational environment—characteristics of the enemy, the climate, and the terrain. Free world forces must be prepared to do battle with an enemy that ranges from the modern military machine that the Russians developed and support in Communist China, to the semimodern divisions in North Korea and North Vietnam, the developing conventional forces in Laos or the ruthless Viet Cong terrorists in South Vietnam. And these last, the Viet Cong, are in the process of transformation from semi-organized bands into organized paramilitary units.

Achieving rapport with our Asian allies requires considerable understanding on our part. We must

bear in mind the historical background of our Asian friends. A program, an approach, an attitude which works well in Europe may be inappropriate here.

The climate with which we must be concerned may vary from the subarctic to the tropical.

Rugged mountains, scarce and poor roads, and limited cross-country mobility exist throughout much of Asia. And where there aren't rugged mountains you find flooded rice paddies—or dense jungles. And in the delta areas, as the current battleground in South Vietnam, there is a type of terrain almost all its own.

I want to emphasize one thing in particular: we must think of this terrain as *different* rather than difficult. The Communists use this terrain to advantage. Our soldiers have more initiative than theirs and our industry has greater technical skill than his. The free world has the potential of using this terrain, which can't be changed, to even better advantage than the adversary. We must get our soldiers and our schools to think of terrain as an additional weapon rather than as an obstacle, something that hinders us. For example, in our traditional terrain analysis we normally categorize rivers as obstacles. Yet, in Southeast Asia, waterways are so numerous we must reorient our thinking and recognize these waterways as avenues of approach and as lines of communications. Designs for modern equipment to do this are available and need only to be produced and given to the troops.

Thus, this difference in the terrain of Pacific-Asia means that forces developed there and committed there must be tailored for the particular operational environment in which they might have to operate.

In order to take advantage of the waterways and swamps and in order to seek out and destroy the enemy in his lair, special land-water units should be organized. Our Army personnel who participated in operations in the South Pacific in World War II have experience that could be used to advantage although the inland requirements in Asia are different than amphibious operations as we normally know them. What we need is exploitation of amphibious techniques and equipment in inland tactics and operations.

There would not be mass assaults over short distances with floating depots nearby and with extensive naval gunfire support. The land-water units themselves must be self-contained and be able to operate along the lines of the Army's mechanized cavalry in World War II. They must be capable of extending operations by independent platoons and companies. However, the mode of transportation for men and fire support will be dugouts, river boats, or improved amphibious carriers as the Army's M113. I suppose this now becomes "waterized cavalry"—and Communist guerrilla tactics are not completely unlike the Indian tactics in the early days of western expansion.

One of the biggest problems is to find the small enemy units operating in the dense jungle areas or in the delta regions. High performance aircraft have considerable difficulty finding the elusive enemy bands

much less hitting them. Thus, for the eyes and ears of our combat elements in warfare of this type, we need aircraft that can fly in the nap of the earth and hover over suspected areas.

We could not easily motor our forces over this terrain with its limited poor road nets—but we could fly them over it. We could organize companies and bat-

talions—again along the lines of the World War II mechanized cavalry with similar light weapons and good communications. However, in this case, we would plan to transport our line companies in helicopters rather than in armored cars and trucks. And we must provide the mobile fire power with helicopters armed with rockets to take the place of the tank companies.

## KOREAN PROBLEMS

**By Maj. Gen. SAM C. RUSSELL**  
*Chief of Staff, U. S. Eighth Army*

A standard question is "Why is the U. S. Army in Korea?" The answer to that is an excellent illustration as to why the U. S. must have a forward strategy. The answer involves several factors: First, the deterrence of a renewed enemy attack into the Republic of Korea; second, having sufficient forces on the ground to hold an enemy attack until theater and continental U. S. units can arrive to launch counter attacks; third, providing know-how and an in-being command organization to control allied operations should the enemy attack; and, fourth, instilling confidence in our Asiatic Allies that we are firmly behind them and will help protect them.

We are demonstrating in a convincing manner to the Koreans—and in fact to the rest of Asia—the willingness of the U. S. to share the hazards of freedom in today's world. A fact of life today is that U. S. military power is the backbone of free world strength in Asia. Without this military power, deployed and ready, the Communist military machine would roll over the remaining free nations in Asia.

A quick look at the comparative strengths of the allied forces in Korea and the strength of the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces just next door makes the fact obvious that our defense will have to be an allied defense—this includes the forces of the United States, Republic of Korea, and other free world allies.

As to command, do not visualize United Nations Command, U. S. Forces Korea and Eighth U. S. Army as a series of headquarters operating separately with



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large overheads and duplication of staff responsibilities. First, the staffs of the United Nations Command and of U. S. Forces Korea are one and the same and are relatively small. Second, the staff members of United Nations Command and Eighth Army all work in the same compound and are closely integrated in their daily activities.

Eighth Army is organized for combat to insure unity of effort and command. It is organized to take maximum advantage of Republic of Korea Army strength. Republic of Korea has the third largest Army in the free world and it is a fine Army; a fighting outfit which I am extremely proud to be associated with.

There are two major Army *combat* groupings in Korea: The First Republic of Korea Army and I Corps (Group). These two major combat headquarters are assigned responsibility for our forward battle areas in Korea with First Republic of Korea Army on the right and I Corps on the left. First Republic of Korea Army has responsibility for approximately two-thirds of our forward battle area.

I Corps (Group) contains both U. S. and Republic of Korea elements.

It is actually more like a U. S. field army than a U. S. corps in our traditional sense. It, in fact, has operational control over a Republic of Korea corps and the usual U. S. corps components, plus Republic of Korea marine forces and the Thai and Turk units.

A prerequisite to a successful forward strategy is sufficient strength prepositioned in key forward areas, such as Korea, so that we can retain lodgments to which our theater strike force and Strategic Army Corps can deploy. This prepositioned strength must be in the form of both U. S. and local forces.

There are two facets to the amount of strength the

U. S. must position forward. One is the strength of the indigenous elements relative to the potential enemy forces. The other is the time necessary to deploy reinforcements from theater reserve and from the continental United States. Our present strategic airlift capability is such that, in my opinion, the Eighth Army elements in Korea now are only the bare minimum.

U. S. Forces in Korea are austere, consisting primarily of two U. S. divisions and limited logistic and combat support elements. This may appear as rather a small contribution to the defense of Korea; however, these two divisions are 15 per cent of the total active divisions in the entire U. S. Army, and in the strategic concept I have mentioned, we visualize reinforcing our contribution in the event the enemy initiates hostilities.

At the present time, in order to maintain the combat capability of our two divisions within the spaces allocated to us, we have provided these divisions with Korean soldiers. The utilization of these KATUSAS dates from the Korean War.

They enable us to maintain our divisions at full combat strength within the spaces allocated to us. In fact, Eighth Army as a whole would require several thousand additional spaces to bring all U. S. units up to full strength with U. S. personnel. We may find that it is desirable to extend this system to other forces in other geographical areas of the world.

As mentioned before, enhancing the capabilities of the Republic of Korea Army is part and parcel of our forward strategy and of creating the required prepositioned strength. This is done through our Military Assistance Program.

Last year, total U. S. assistance to Korean Forces was approximately 251.0 million. While this is a lot of money, we could not equip, train, and maintain 18 U. S. divisions for this amount.

Eighth Army has a nuclear capability on the ground in its field artillery and missile units. While this nuclear capability must be continually improved as technology advances, we are equally concerned in Korea with ensuring that our conventional capability is adequate. Not having a full conventional capability would limit our flexibility as much as inadequate tactical nuclear capability. This can be summed up in three words, "flexibility of response"—that requirement of which General Taylor has talked and written so eloquently. In fact, flexibility of response is part and parcel of modernization.

Modernization is as important to the U. S. Army as it is to any large corporation and has two aspects: concepts and hardware.

First, I will talk about the modernization of tactical

concepts which are being implemented in Korea today. Our defense plans are constantly being up-dated to meet the requirements of both nuclear and non-nuclear war. Our basic concept of defense is: (a) contain the initial attack; (b) inflict maximum casualties on the enemy; and (c) mount a counter-offensive as soon as possible.

With these three factors in mind, our defense in Korea is organized with positions in depth for resiliency and with sufficient dispersion to preclude unacceptable losses from nuclear strikes.

We have regimental and battle group strong points on key terrain with the areas in between covered by obstacles, fire, patrols, and mobile forces.

We are also placing added emphasis on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. Republic of Korea units, trained in these techniques, are in existence and capable of conducting such operations.

With these tactical concepts, however, it is imperative that Eighth Army ground elements have the capability to mass rapidly from dispersed locations to destroy enemy formations and then just as quickly disperse again. This brings us to a most needed aspect of modernization—new equipment and improved mobility.

There is no room for antiques in modern war. In Eighth Army we are just now replacing our World War I model machine guns with a new model. We hope to be able to replace our pre-World War II M1 rifles with the new M14 rifle.

Eighth Army requires considerable improvement in both ground and air mobility. Strategic air mobility is required to get reinforcements to Korea rapidly and, equally important, battlefield air mobility is required in Korea to cross rivers and by-pass mountain barriers. Ground mobility is required to move the heavy guns and tanks which cannot go by air—to haul the ammunition and supplies which we need to defeat the communists.

Our logistics system in Korea is being modernized as fast as time and money permits. Right now we have our major supply facilities in the Seoul-Inchon-Ascom complex.

This is the most desirable location for peacetime operations; however, we cannot be certain of its availability in the event of renewed hostilities because of its proximity to the front lines. Thus, we are working on a program of dispersing our supplies and depots throughout the length of Korea and building new depots in the Waegwan-Taegu area.

Logistics is a big problem both before and after supplies arrive in Korea. At the present time because of our remote location, it takes in excess of 100 days from the time a company commander places an order until supplies are on the dock in Pusan.

Air movement is one answer to reducing the time-distance problem. However, our present air movement capability—both tactical and strategic—is such that only critical, high priority items can be moved by air,

and over 99 per cent of our supplies come to us by water.

First class soldiers deserve first class equipment. We have first class soldiers, allied and U. S.—we are

modernizing the equipment of our forces in Korea but the process is too slow. There is still too much World War II equipment in the hands of U. S. and allied forces that need replacement.

## THE CASE OF THAILAND

By Maj. Gen. SURAKIJ MAYALARP

*Director of Logistics, Royal Thai Army*

As a peninsula stretching to the south, with the islands of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand further down, Thailand is gaining strategic importance as a buffer in the defense of the countries of the Free World in this region, and as a key terrain for counter operations. The loss of this peninsula and the islands of the south would disrupt the supply route between East and West, the result of which I see no need to say.

From the location of the country, and the study of the present crisis in Southeast Asia, it is quite evident that any aggression towards Thailand is likely to come from the north and northeast because of the proximity of our potential enemy and good avenues of approach in that area. Moreover, you probably know that the armed forces of the chief enemy of the free world in this region is superior in ground forces. For these reasons, I strongly believe that aggression in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, would be principally by ground forces. Aggression by enemy naval forces may be possible only on a smaller scale, which should be an easy task for the combined powerful U. S. and Thai fleet to counter.

At the beginning of the U. S. Military Assistance Program, the Royal Thai Army had on hand military equipment of various foreign origins. With the advent of the U. S. Military Assistance Program beginning in 1950, the primary task of the Royal Thai Army, aided by the assistance of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, was the modernization of her troop units, that is, to equip and train a modern fighting machine capable of defending Thailand against aggression.

During 1951-1956, approximately 95 per cent of all

foreign equipment was replaced by U. S. World War II equipment.

After 11 years, there has been a vast change in the modernization of the combat elements. Former units have been reorganized and equipped with modern matériel and well trained in its use. Equipment originally furnished, of the latest type then, has been replaced with more modern equipment. At the same time, both within Thailand and off-shore, a vigorous training program has been conducted to train the Royal Thai Army. The improvement in the tactical and combat capabilities of the Royal Thai Army which has been accomplished so far can be seen today in an Army confident and able to work with its allies, the United States and other SEATO countries.

The Royal Thai Army, like other armies, maintains a minimum number of troops consistent with security in peace time. Due to budgetary restrictions this is less than 100,000 men. However, the Royal Thai Army fully recognizes the threat Thailand faces and is prepared to provide for a rapid build-up of our defense forces as conditions require.

The United States has assisted us far beyond what we could have accomplished alone. It is vast in concept and execution. The cost to the United States is staggering, and we appreciate the fact that it would be impossible for the United States to assume the burden to assist every nation in the whole world. Therefore, we do understand the concept of mutual assistance and self-help program. We wish we could stand on our own feet some time.

We recognize the present weaknesses of the Royal Thai Army structure. In essence, we are organized basically in line with the structure of the U. S. Army of the World War II period. We are in the process of modifying our present structure to incorporate the concepts and techniques developed in the past few years. We plan to reorganize the Royal Thai Army in such a manner as to gain maximum fighting strength, mobility, and firepower to create fast moving, hard hitting, and self-contained units capable of fighting in



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rugged terrain and fully trained in the concepts of guerrilla and antiguerilla warfare. We have much to do in perfecting our logistics organization.

Thailand now has an Army whose combat units are capable of carrying out their missions of defense in Southeast Asia. Due to budgetary limitations, however, the Royal Thai Army can only maintain what it already has. It cannot improve without assistance. The greatest problem of the Royal Thai Army is our inability to meet the demand for more troop units and equipment.

Militarily we need to have some special forces. These forces should be organized light, small, self-contained and highly mobile, equipped with effective communications and a high degree of fire power. For the best use of these special forces, special support troops, such as air transport units and light transportation units, capable of movement in any kind of terrain are required. This is the type of forces the Royal Thai Army needs to cope with the unconventional warfare tactics of the aggressor.

We lack many logistical supporting troops.

Aside from the mentioned troops, some special units such as intelligence units, counter intelligence detachments, and psychological warfare units are essential for operating in different fields of activity.

In short, the Royal Thai Army needs more of both conventional and unconventional type troops to be able to defend Thailand, and to be more effective in assisting in the defense of the Free World in Southeast Asia.

I would like to say something about the Military Assistance Program to Thailand. MAP in Thailand has equipped and modernized the Royal Thai Army. However, we still have the problem of replacing certain equipment received early in the program and now obsolete, by standard equipment. JUSMAG in Thailand helps in improving our organization and standard of training, and in making our MAP-supported units much more effective. We are proud that our rifle company in Korea, attached to the U. S. 7th Infantry Division, made the best score in that division's last company tests. Logistics, while still weak, are progressing constantly and we are working closely with JUSMAG to continue this improvement.

As I have indicated previously, our military budget is limited because a large share of Thailand's national budget must be diverted to improvement of the economy of the country to enable us some day to stand on our own feet and to assume full support of our own forces. In the meantime, MAP has enabled us to obtain the equipment needed to replace the old obsolete and varied assortment of weapons and equipment we formerly had. Our funds have been barely sufficient to enable us to clothe, feed, pay, administer and partially maintain our Army.

However, the threat now is greater than ever before, and it seems that we must develop greater capability for our defense. This means increased strength and some additional units designed to meet the increased threat of guerrilla activities as well as more conventional warfare. We hope that MAP can react soon enough to meet these requirements.

If I may be so bold, I might make some suggestions from the point of view of the recipients of U. S. military assistance on how the Military Assistance Program could be improved. These are not gripes and we realize that the United States has its problems too and appreciate that some are difficult to solve.

(1) The future assistance should be more complete. The aid program which is limited to only certain items of equipment causes the recipient country to provide many additional items of equipment and other requirements such as supplies, buildings, and utilities herself which seem to be much more than she can afford.

(2) The assistance should be carried on continuously, regularly, and without interruption according to long term plan and with a definite objective. It would be beneficial for the recipient country to participate in this planning.

(3) The assistance should be increased in the areas of technical training and education. These are essential for the proper utilization and maintenance of the equipment.

(4) The assistance should be aimed at allowing as much self-help as possible. This may require tremendous efforts but will yield good results in the long run by building up the recipient country and eliminating the endless assistance from the U. S.

(5) The assistance should be consistent with the need and the desire of the receiver. We have a proverb which says, "A house must be built in the ways the dweller wants."

(6) The assistance should be timed to the situation and the immediate demand. A good logistian has a motto: "To get supplies of the right kind, to the right place, and at the right time."

Now, concerning the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, we in the Royal Thai Army would like to extend our thanks to all officers and men of the JUSMAG who have worked in Thailand. They work closely with us, giving valuable advice and assistance wholeheartedly and becoming our good friends. What I am going to say now may be good to know.

(1) The duration of their stay should be lengthened. The tour of one to two years is insufficient for such an assignment. It takes a long time to learn the job but when he understands it, his time is up.

(2) JUSMAG personnel always get the work done well if they understand the people, learn our customs, and know what we want, and even better if they know a little of the Thai language.

# THE ARMY'S ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA

By Maj. Gen. THEODORE F. BOGART  
Commanding General, U. S. Army, Caribbean

*This report on the "Army's Role in Latin America" has been necessarily condensed. Only portions of the presentations by General Bogart and Colonel Unverferth appear here and the presentations by Lt. Col. John E. Goldoni, Commanding Officer, U. S. Jungle Warfare Training Center; Maj. Gen. Alejandro Cuadra Rabines, Minister of War, Republic of Peru; and Col. Miguel A. Ponciano Samayoa, Chief of Staff, Guatemalan Army, have been omitted entirely.*

The U.S. Army Caribbean is one of the three service components of the unified command known as Caribbean Command with headquarters located in the Canal Zone and commanded by Lieutenant General Andrew P. O'Meara. This is the only unified command, world-wide, under an Army officer. The responsibilities of USARCARIB encompass the entire land area of South and Central America. It also includes the Antilles Command, where, in Puerto Rico, we operate an English language training center for inductees and where we provide certain logistical support to the Navy, Air Force, National Guard and Reserves.

In Puerto Rico we also provide advisors to the National Guard and instructors to Reserve units and ROTC.

The missions assigned to United States Army Caribbean are to provide for the ground defense of the Panama Canal and to implement the Army portion of United States policies and international agreements pertaining to Latin America.

To carry out these missions, USARCARIB is authorized 7,600 military and 5,200 civilian personnel. Of the total civilians, 2,600—or 50 per cent—are non-U.S. In order to finance our operations yearly, we are allocated approximately \$35 million.

To carry out our primary tactical mission of providing ground defense of the Panama Canal, our basic



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tactical force structure consists of two infantry battle groups, one composite missile air defense battalion and normal supporting units. We are prepared to receive additional troop units from the United States when necessary. We are prepared to carry out tasks which may be assigned under the provisions of the Rio Pact, by which the U.S. and Latin American republics agreed that "any armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered an attack against all the American states." By way of preparing to meet various plans based upon this agreement, we have held, in recent years, large-scale training exercises in the Republic of Panama.

To carry out the Army portion of United States policy and international agreements with Latin America, we have developed four Inter-American relationship missions.

The first of these missions, that of providing logistical assistance in event of disaster, is accomplished through our normal agencies. Recent examples were in 1960, when both Chile and Peru were struck by earthquakes.

Our responsibility for operating and supervising the Army mission program in South and Central America is increasing in importance. Involved in the execution of this program in Latin America are 15 Army missions and the Army element of the Joint Military Commission in Brazil.

To give you an idea of the tremendously large land mass over which the mission program operates in our area of mission responsibility, consider these comparative figures: The land mass of the United States is approximately 3.5 million square miles, while that of the area of Latin America is approximately 8 million square miles. The population of all countries in our area of responsibility in Latin America is approximately 197 million as compared with 182 million for the United States, excluding Alaska.

There are almost 200 Army personnel assigned to our 16 Army missions. The strengths of the missions vary from the smallest in Panama, consisting of only two officers, to the largest in Venezuela which is authorized 17 officers and 16 enlisted men. The size and

composition of the individual missions are determined by mutual agreement between the United States and the country concerned.

The major objective of the U.S. Army mission programs agreed jointly by the United States and the Latin American country concerned, is "to assist in advising as required in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the host government Army forces." In Argentina and Paraguay, the United States provides personnel to serve as instructors in the host government military schools and additionally, assists in the supervision of the activities of these institutions. The Veterinary Corps officers assigned to the mission in Panama function as advisors to the ministry of agriculture and industry.

Our mission personnel are making important contributions in developing goodwill and friendship. They and their families actively participate in community affairs and through association with the leaders and future leaders of the country can and do contribute in the development of goodwill and mutual understanding. Daily performance of duty requires mission personnel to speak and write in the Spanish language, except in Brazil where Portuguese is used.

Provision of specialized training to selected Latin American personnel and units continues to be a matter of important consideration. Frequently, small units from Latin American countries are trained in the Canal Zone by our tactical units and technical services. For example, we have provided weapons and infantry tactical training recently for a rifle platoon from El Salvador. A group of Brazilians received training with an armored unit in tracked vehicle maintenance and armor tactics. At the present time a group of Bolivian cadets are being given a four-month special training program by one of our battle groups in the Canal Zone prior to their being commissioned. Weapons training for elements of the Panama National Guard has also been provided, and the latter has participated in a number of our tactical exercises.

We provide on-the-job training for Latin American specialists and technicians with our engineer, ordnance, signal, and other technical agencies in the Canal Zone.

The second annual Pan-American rifle matches were held in the Canal Zone under United States Army Caribbean sponsorship in March of this year. Fourteen Latin American countries participated. We anticipate the Pan-American matches will continue as an annual competition, increasing in scope and importance. These matches not only stimulate interest in developing good shooting but also serve in developing understanding and friendship.

Maintenance and use of equipment, supplies and ammunition in Latin American units, under cognizance of the missions, is of vital concern to my command. This is particularly true for matériel authorized under the military assistance program. The United States Army Caribbean Latin American school at Fort Gulick

stresses correct maintenance procedures in all courses of instruction. Mobile maintenance training teams are provided for countries requesting such assistance. Senior members of my staff and I make periodic visits to each mission and learn first-hand of their problems. These visits serve to develop and maintain friendship and understanding with key host officials.

In the area of formal military schooling, the United States Army Caribbean arranges for Latin American personnel to attend courses of instruction at all levels through Command and General Staff College in the United States. Latin American students attending these courses derive great benefit from the training provided and usually become oriented and sold on our way of doing things.

I consider our mission program for providing mutual assistance training as one of the United States Army Caribbean's most challenging assignments.

Our third Inter-American Relationship mission is that of providing technical assistance and specialized equipment for map-making through the U.S. Army Inter-American Geodetic Survey (Servicio Geodesico Interamericano). The mission of this unit is to accomplish the Army's portion of the mapping program in the Caribbean area, and in Latin America.

*(At this point General Bogart introduced Colonel John E. Unverferth, Director of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, whose briefing has been condensed in the following quoted paragraphs.)*

"The IAGS was organized in 1946 as a special topographic mapping unit of the Corps of Engineers for the purpose of executing the Western hemisphere mapping and charting program.

"The main purposes of the IAGS are to help the Latins map their countries, and produce the maps required for the Western Hemisphere.

"Since 1946, IAGS has been conducting geodetic and mapping operations over an area of some eight million square miles, stretching almost 6,000 miles from the southern border of the Continental United States to land's end at the Strait of Magellan. Consequently, our forces are exposed to every weather condition known to man. These extreme weather variations are often experienced within comparatively short distances.

"All our work has been accomplished in full co-operation with the participating countries, the host countries as a group contributing over half the cost.

"It isn't possible at this time to say when IAGS will complete its mission. Mapping is never finished. There is much we can do to assist Latin America in mapping, and at the same time help the United States. An economic expansion of great magnitude is occurring in Latin America. This is aided by the United States program for economic assistance. Point IV missions are preparing development projections expeditiously. Many of these projects must use as a base an accurate



## JUST VISITING

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topographic map. Point IV funds for mapping are included in these projects, and local national collaborating agencies will spend these funds. These agencies are being required to expand and do more work at a tremendous pace, which results in increased scope of IAGS activity.

"In conclusion, while IAGS is supporting the United States' development program at an increased pace, it is also implementing map plan objectives."

*(At the conclusion of Colonel Unverferth's briefing, General Bogart continued his discussion of the four Inter-American Relationship missions.)*

Our fourth Inter-American Relationship Mission is that of providing specialized military training to Latin American officers and enlisted men. This is accomplished principally through two schools in the Panama area: the United States Army Caribbean School at Fort Gulick and the Jungle Warfare Training School at Fort Sherman.

Recently, the USARCARIB school graduated its 10,588th Latin American student. Many graduates of the school now hold positions of key importance in their home countries. We feel that this educational program is of great importance to our relations with Latin America.

In the recently concluded Army conference of Latin American nations at USARCARIB headquarters, 64 senior military representatives of 17 American nations participated. This five-day conference was designed to allow discussion of mutual problems, facilitate the exchange of ideas, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship and understanding among the free nations of this hemisphere. Presentations were made by Department of Defense and Department of the Army briefing teams, and by Caribbean Command and USARCARIB personnel. Such subjects as intelligence, combat developments, the civic action program, research and development, and counter-resistance, were presented. The last two days of the conference were devoted to a symposium, organized into three committees with a representative of all participating countries on each. Reports presented on the final day by the elected chairmen of the three symposium committees reflected the seriousness with which the conferees entered into the discussions, freely expressed their ideas and thoughts, and finally arrived at conclusions.

I can say without reservation that the attitudes reflected by the Latin American delegates were positive, progressive, and 100 per cent for hemispheric solidarity, both for the development of common doctrine, and against the encroachment of the Communist menace. The potential ideological threat posed by the Cuban situation was a primary subject of interest, and the consensus among most conferees was that this

situation is undoubtedly the most immediate threat to the Americas. The views of the conferees were perhaps best exemplified by the spokesman from one country who stated, "All the recommendations and conclusions reached by the different working groups during this conference form a solid foundation on which to build a democratic doctrine, which in turn will be the basis for a plan of action, of democratic ideology, offensive in nature, against our common enemy . . . Communism."

The delegates' opinion was that this hemisphere must begin immediately to develop common policies and doctrines to deal with this danger, and, to facilitate this program, a means for the timely exchange of information must be developed. As another country spokesman said, "We shelter the hope that these conclusions and recommendations will be the basis for immediate action in defense of the destinies of the Western world." The underlying current noticeable throughout the entire conference was one of urgency—immediacy—the need for swift action. A common quote among the delegates was, "Let's get moving—it's late!"

The United States Army was asked by the conferees to take the initiative in developing and implementing the means for necessary training, and for the joint exchange of information. We are doing this.

We were most gratified by the positive attitude displayed by the participating nations. I sincerely believe that this gathering together of military leaders of our sister Republics achieved a unity and sparked a singleness of purpose never before enjoyed in this hemisphere.

The spokesman from another country stated, "We have found at this conference that by bringing together fellow officers of the armies of the Republics of this hemisphere, we have had a communion of sentiment, and all of these sentiments are predicated primarily on our common belief that we should do everything in our power to safeguard the liberty which is so dear to us."

These type conferences have given us a springboard for further action directed toward achieving our objective of hemispheric solidarity.

I feel that these conferences and visits have not only improved and enhanced the operations of our missions, but have also served to initiate personal friendships between the Latin American military leaders. Military leaders in this part of the world have historically occupied an influential position in the affairs of their countries and have proved to be an important factor in countering communist aggression.

In summary, our share of the Army's Global Frontier role is twofold: military and humanitarian. We accomplish our role by maintaining a positive defense capability for the Canal, a progressive training and maintenance program for our Latin American neighbors, and a dynamic program of international goodwill and understanding.

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
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## LOOK TO THE NORTH

By Col. ROBERT H. SAFFORD

*Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Alaska*

Militarily we can look on the Arctic as an area for strategic operations, as a training area, and as a test laboratory. All three are important.

A quick study of the globe shows the importance of the Far North as an area for strategic operations. We define the area of northern operations as that portion of the world inclosed by the 50° isotherm. This is an imaginary line encompassing those areas of the Arctic and sub-Arctic where the mean daily temperature for the warmest four months of the year does not exceed 50° F. This area covers all of Alaska, Canada, a part of the upper midwest, Greenland, the upper Scandinavian Peninsula, and half of Korea; it covers 65 percent of Russia to include all of Siberia.

If you look at a polar projection of the globe you will see that Europe, Asia, and North America come closest together at the North Pole. The shortest distance between the principal population and industrial centers of Eurasia and North America is over the polar regions.

Here is another comparison. The distance from the Continental United States to Eurasia via the polar route is roughly 5,500 miles, whereas from Fairbanks, Alaska, it is a mere 3,400 miles. You can see that by using bases on our Northern frontier we gain a significant range advantage over similar bases in CONUS.

We must secure maximum warning of an air or missile attack on the U.S. launched from Eurasia. The curvature of the earth requires us to locate our warning stations as near the top of the world as possible in order to look down on the other side. The DEW line was located along the Arctic Circle for this reason. For the same reason our BMEWS (ballistic missile) and MIDAS (missile detection) sites are being located in the Far North.

Thus geography combines with the increased range of modern weapons to highlight the strategic importance of the northland as an advanced outpost for early warning, interception of aircraft or missile attacks and for launching attacks or counterattacks.

Geography alone, however, does not account for the

entire importance of this area. Political, economic, and psychological aspects are also significant. Since Alaska has become a state these aspects have the same relation as to any other of the United States.

Thus far we have generalized on the strategic significance of the overall Far North. With this as a backdrop, let us look at Alaska specifically.

Before looking at Alaska as a training area, a brief statement of the U. S. Army, Alaska, is in order. We are responsible for the ground defense of Alaska; for the protection of the Air Forces' air defense complexes; for Arctic research and development (to include support for CONARC's Arctic Test Board; and for arctic training of selected officers and men from the entire Army.




Col. SAFFORD

To accomplish these missions Hq. U. S. Army, Alaska, which comes under the Joint Alaskan Command has two main complexes, one in the Anchorage area, the other in the Fairbanks area. Each area has a battle group, reinforced, and a Nike Hercules battalion. These Nike battalions are operationally under control of NORAD through the Alaskan Command Control Centers. Additionally we have a new research and development center at Fort Wainwright, and the Cold Weather and Mountain School at Fort Greely in the Yukon.

Alaska has nearly everything to offer for training an army for a multi-capability to fight anywhere under any set of conditions.

Small wars, large wars, nuclear wars, conventional wars and unconventional warfare operations with Special Forces will probably all have certain charac-



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At recent exercises, an Army-Industry team successfully demonstrated that automatic data processing systems can help to

reduce the time it takes to prepare a Divisional Fire Plan from a matter of hours to a matter of minutes. When computers process ballistic solutions at electronic speeds, they aid in achieving first-round target hits. This means saving ammunition—conventional or nuclear. It also means surprise—hitting the target while it is unprepared and vulnerable. The long-range program of developing Command Control Information Systems is now being extended to other Tactical Field Army functions, utilizing the FIELDATA family of equipment.

Development and testing of artillery fire planning and control systems are being done by the U.S. Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, with the cooperation and support of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Technical assistance is being provided by Ramo-Wooldridge, a Division of Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Inc.

Challenging openings now exist at Ramo-Wooldridge's Fort Huachuca office for experienced computer programmers, systems analysts and test and applications engineers. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment, regardless of race, creed, color or national origin.

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teristics in common in the future. They will probably be fought on large widely dispersed battle areas; they will demand a high degree of mobility, individual and unit, over all types of terrain; they may well require operations in extremes of weather; they probably will cause units to be isolated and operate independently; and they undoubtedly will require a high degree of initiative, toughness, and ingenuity on the part of the individual soldier if he is able to survive and to fight; and they will most certainly require the most modern of equipment.

All this, we believe, adds up to the requirement for especially realistic training—training in an area and an environment which approximates the probable battle conditions as nearly as possible. This can be had in Alaska.

Alaska has been too long regarded solely as a vast cold chamber for special training in extreme cold only. This is wrong. Except for the heat of the jungle and the sand of the desert, Alaska in fact offers a wide variety of conditions which can be used to approximate realistically almost any battle area in which the U.S. Army is likely to fight.

Here in Alaska training can be most ruggedly realistic. Vast, sparsely populated areas with a wide variety of terrain are available for training from small units up through large scale maneuver exercises. USARAL forces are undergoing this rugged training throughout the year.

In the spring, following the annual large scale maneuver, we will find isolated small units on long range patrols operating over extremely rugged terrain. In short, gaining small unit and individual know-how and initiative.

In the summer, troops will be found learning to navigate the swift Alaskan rivers, one of the primary means of communications in the summer in the Far North. They will also be working over open muskeg, tundra flats, and swampy marshes. It's obvious that if they can operate in these conditions, they can operate in other similarly difficult areas of the world.

As the fall and winter close in, the troops must master still another art: living, moving, and fighting effectively in the cold and snow. They learn to ski and snowshoe, to operate oversnow equipment, and to live and fight in the cold. This demands the highest possible state of both individual and unit training.

Throughout the year, in all seasons, units are taking part in long range air mobility exercises with Air Force units. They are also learning to use Army aviation to its full effectiveness because heavy reliance must be placed on this in order to move across the rugged Alaskan terrain.

They are also training with the Alaska National Guard Scout Battalions, composed of native Eskimos

and Indians, on the outer periphery of this vast state.

Another interesting aspect of our training is the annual service practice of our Nike-Hercules battalions. Unlike other such units, our battalions do not have to travel to a firing range to have service practice; they fire from their regular tactical positions. Their range is literally in their own back yards.

In addition to all these activities, we hold a large scale winter maneuver each year with STRAC units during February, the coldest month of the year. The central maneuver area in 1961 was larger than the entire State of Delaware. In 1962 it will be even larger.

But not all the activity takes place in the central maneuver area. A good part of the action in 1961 involved Special Forces units operating with the Alaskan Scout Battalions on the periphery. In the 1962 maneuver, we plan to expand Special Forces operations considerably.


Those are but the highlights of the tough, realistic Alaskan training, the type of training necessary to prepare the U.S. Army to fight on any future battlefield.

Alaska, we believe, is the senior service school for training the individual and the unit. When they have successfully met the stern challenges of Alaskan training, they have earned their master's degree in the school of warfare. They will be ready to fight anywhere, anytime.

Let's look at Alaska as a test laboratory. USARAL is the only U.S. Army force directly and specifically concerned today with northern warfare. Our responsibility is not limited to Alaska. In the larger sense, our responsibility includes development of doctrine that will enable the Army to fight effectively in northern regions where and as required.

This current operational mission is the foundation for our cold weather doctrine and equipment development activities. In our annual maneuvers and our year-round training exercises we identify the problems that require development action and we test development results. A primary doctrine objective of these exercises is reduction of the average man's fear of the cold and of the average engineer's subconscious belief that there is something basically different about cold weather operations.

A simple example is the matter of field bath units. Until the winter of 1960-61, USARAL had no field bath capability. Why not? Because a portable shower unit won't work at low temperatures. And how did everyone know that it wouldn't work? Well, it is obvious, isn't it?—water freezes at 32°. In spite of this obvious fact we took some standard M1958 portable shower units into the field in Exercise Willow Freeze. They were still working at minus 37°. We didn't record any lower temperatures, so we don't know how cold



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it has to be before hot water freezes. But we pushed back the veil of mystery over northern operations a little farther.

We are assisted in our doctrine mission by an increasing R&D effort in Alaska. The Navy Arctic Lab is located at Point Barrow. The Air Force Aeromedical Lab has been operated at Ladd AFB, now Fort Wainwright, for several years, doing work, much of which is of direct interest to the Army. Army activities include CONARC Arctic Test Board at Fort Greely, which tests all equipment designed primarily for northern use and check tests for northern applications all other Army equipment. The ATB is located on the same installation with the Army Cold Weather and Mountain School, operated by USARAL, and the two agencies are able to exchange ideas and information.

The majority of the Army arctic test activities which were located at Fort Churchill until 30 June 1961 will be established at Fort Wainwright in time for the 1961-62 winter testing season, where the testing activities have practically unlimited range and proving ground areas which provide a complete variety of soil and weather conditions. Only 100 miles by good road from the ATB at Fort Greely, Army R&D activities can coordinate and work with the CONARC northern operations test agencies. Located at the home station of USARAL's Yukon Command, R&D agencies will be able to observe field operating problems of USARAL troop units at first hand as they generate. In addition the 1962 winter maneuver will be conducted in the area between Fort Wainwright and Fort Greely, so that Army R&D and test agencies in Alaska will have a grandstand seat for major tactical demonstrations.

This concentration of operational research and testing activities promises an improvement of research reaction to user requirements, better guidance to R&D agencies, and the possibility of a considerable reduction in R&D lead time.

A most important fact is that while operations in the north emphasize certain operating problems, in general the problems of northern operations are not unique. The mobility requirements for northern operations are representative of the mobility requirements for the entire Army in all areas of the world. The firepower needs and the training needs of USARAL this year are similar to those of the rest of the Army for next year. In no operational area is this fact as self-evident as in that of the small war, the sublimited war, that we must be prepared to fight wherever friendly nations need support.

The northern combat force requires first of all high mobility, independent of roads, a requirement found in many areas of the world. In the north, roads are generally nonexistent. In Laos, Cuba, and Malaya roads where they exist are further reduced in utility by being the first targets for guerrilla action. The cross-

country mobile ground weapons and the helicopter mobility that are required in the north are required across the entire spectrum of combat areas.

Support of the soldier in the north is expensive in effort. Therefore, we must make him the most effective fighting instrument we can. High yet efficient individual firepower is one requirement to this end. In the jungle the same requirement arises.


The weapons that support the infantry unit in either case must have high mobility and optimized fire effects.

A high state of individual training is at least as important in the north as it is in any other potential combat area. Here the individual must be especially self-reliant, able to keep himself alive and effective in the face of both enemy and environment.

While war may be fought in the classic theater with conventional large units the more difficult problem is the domination of very large northern areas with small forces. The USARAL concept of an optimum force for this more difficult job is based on the small unit task force—company, battalion, or brigade. The force should be fully mobile in cross-country operations, winter and summer. Mobility is enhanced by reduction of the weight of individual equipment by use, for example, of tentage providing adequate protection at a weight of five pounds per man, instead of the present 50. All vehicles should be transportable in medium transport aircraft in order that full advantage may be taken of air mobility to overcome the tremendous distances in northern operations. Personnel carriers, artillery, and logistic vehicles must be lightweight, austere, and dependable. Since massing of artillery fires is hardly feasible when two or three battalions are operating over 10,000 square miles, close air support must be used aggressively and generously as a substitute for general support artillery. Nuclear weapons are required, of course, but a full range of conventional firepower is needed to allow the selection of the degrees of force that is suited to the target.

This type force, light and lean, fully mobile both strategically and tactically, powerful out of proportion to its size by present day terms, trained to deal with the hazards of weather and terrain without impairment of operational effectiveness, is the type force required not only for the Army in the north but for the entire Army in the small war environment. Augmented with armor and heavy artillery, this same force is highly effective as part of a larger force.

With the Army's only current northern operation mission, with access to a growing concentration of research and testing activities, with huge range and maneuver areas available, with a concept of combat that requires the kind of force needed everywhere in the Army, USARAL offers a ready made laboratory to play its part in the continued development of a versatile, keen-edged, hard-hitting Army.




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Solar *Saturn* gas turbine-driven pumps are easily moved from job to job as requirements change. They can run on virtually any kind of fuel, including gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, natural gas and LPG fuels.

The *Saturn* engine is operating or scheduled for a number of pump jobs.



Phillips Pipeline Company has a *Saturn* gas turbine-driven pump at its El Dorado, Kansas, station. It provides up to 1900 gallons of liquefied products per minute at 2500 ft of head. This *Saturn* turbine-driven pump runs automatically on natural gas from the line on a continuous duty basis. It weighs just 7800 lbs. Comparable piston-driven units weigh between 50,000 and 75,000 lbs.

Mid-America Pipeline Company will use a *Saturn* turbine pump to increase propane capacity at the company's booster station near Whiting, Iowa. The unit is skid-mounted and will run on propane fuel taken from the pipeline.

Okan Pipeline Company has a *Saturn* gas turbine to drive a booster pump in its main pipeline, which carries liquid petroleum products. The *Saturn* gas turbine runs on liquid butane most of the time but is capable

of running on other refined liquid fuels.

The Western Company has a *Saturn* gas turbine-driven fracturing pump designed to stimulate production of older oil wells. Mounted on a commercial bobtailed truck, the *Saturn* turbine-powered pump delivers 1000 hydraulic hp per unit over a wide range of volume-pressure ratios. Weight of the truck and fracturing unit is 15,000 lbs lighter than 600 hp diesel units used by Western, allowing for increased mobility.

Solar gas turbines start instantly in any climate and accept full load without warmup. The *Saturn* gas turbine is vibration free and requires no elaborate foundation. Simplified design assures easy, low cost installation and maintenance.

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# REPORT ON AIR DEFENSE OF CONUS

By Lt. Gen. ROBERT J. WOOD

*Commanding General, Army Air Defense Command*

How do we stand today in the matter of air defense? What has happened to the delicate balance between our strength and the strength of the major competing corporation, one which has a record of wicked infighting?

Since last year's meeting of this Association, the capabilities of our competitor have increased substantially. If unopposed he could deliver the equivalent of many hundreds of megatons of explosives on North American targets of his choosing.

According to the Rockefeller Report of a few years ago, if he were to concentrate this awesome destruction on 50 targets, he could destroy three fourths of our plant structure and kill or injure upwards of 50 million of our people.

From the air defense point of view, our adversary is a triple-threat outfit. He has at his command a mix of bombardment aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, all capable of delivering nuclear weapons and his capabilities are increasing, either quantitatively, qualitatively, or both.

The bomber will remain a potentially fatal threat through this decade. The unhappy truth is that the missile threat is not *replacing* the bomber threat; it is *added* to it.

The second part of the triple threat we face is the submarine-launched missile.

The third element of the triple threat is the hostile ICBM, which has been forecast to become the predominant threat to North America in a relatively few years.

To counter the triple threat which faces us, we require a triple defense.

We must defend against the bomber as long as it constitutes a threat, and we must look ahead to develop defenses against the growing missile threat both sub-launched and ICBM.

The responsibility for meeting this threat has been placed on the North American Air Defense Command, or, as we call it, NORAD. NORAD was formed by agreement between the United States and Canada,

and comprises the air defense elements of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Headquarters of this international military force is located at Colorado Springs. The Army element of NORAD is the Army Air Defense Command, or ARADCOM.

The Army has the mission of providing combat-ready Army air defense forces to NORAD. My mission then is to ready these forces for combat, to administer them, to train them, to inspect them, to test them, to evaluate them.

Where are we today? Well, we are in pretty good shape versus the manned bomber and its weapons.

NORAD doesn't claim that we would destroy all of an attacking force, but it does claim that we would destroy enough weapons or weapons carriers to deny an aggressor the opportunity of repeating an attack with the same aircraft, and we would enable the survival of a great percentage of our resources. So much so that at the moment, it would appear foolish indeed for our competitor to risk a manned aircraft attack alone. And we are improving our capabilities all the time. We are not sitting on our status quo, nor do we want or expect to.

In destroying such attacking force, the air defense forces of North America would have to perform four basic functions. These are to detect, to identify, to intercept, and to destroy.

I can report to you then, that we do have a reliable defense against the manned bomber and its weapons, and that we are remaining ahead of this threat by constant improvement of the Nike Hercules system.


Now let's look at the problem of defense against the ballistic missile.

The same four functions — that is, detection,



Gen. WOOD

# Greater Mobility and Reliability for Today's Weapon Systems



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
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identification, interception and destruction — must be performed in defending against a ballistic missile, but under circumstances of greatly compressed time. Where, defending against the bomber, we may have hours of warning, even considering supersonic speeds, to deal with a target; we would in the case of the missile, have only minutes. The ICBM could travel from launching sites on the other side of the world, at say a speed of Mach 20, to targets in North America in about 30 minutes. This great speed, combined with relatively small size, are factors which add to our problem. On the other hand, identification becomes more simple and we have a pretty good idea of the course a ballistic missile must follow.

The problem of detection has been solved, at least in part, by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System of the Air Force. In BMEWS, NORAD has a detection system which is presently partially operational, with the stations in Greenland and Alaska already feeding information to Colorado Springs. The BMEWS station in England will become operational in 1963.

Such warning and identification will enable other elements to launch retaliatory forces and will allow certain passive measures such as heading for the root cellar if we have one. But warning alone will not prevent ballistic missiles from reaching their targets.

In this regard, I would like to quote the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, General Laurence Kuter, who has said: "Our most immediate and pressing requirement is for a defense against the intercontinental ballistic missile. At the present time, the most advanced project under way in this critical area is being conducted by the Army on the Nike-Zeus system."

The Nike-Zeus is a logical extension of the Nike family. It is based on the same tried and proven principles in that it is a rocket, it is command-guided, and it retains its expensive electronic components on the ground. It is being developed by the same proven Army-industry team of Ordnance, Western Electric and Douglas Aircraft plus a fabulous sub-contract structure of more than 3,000 members, which has merited a reputation, not only for meeting specifications but for exceeding them. This team is conservative in its claims, and, to date, has not claimed anything which it has not been able to deliver.

An effective anti-missile defense system would forge an extremely important link in our national defense strategy in that it would assist in providing time for the deliberation required to prevent war by mistake or miscalculation. President Kennedy in a special message to the Congress last March, touched on this vital point when he said:

"Our weapons systems must be usable in a manner permitting deliberation and discrimination as to timing, scope and targets in response to civilian authority; and our defense must be secure against prolonged re-attack as well as surprise first-strike."

The problem of survival of strike forces and pop-

ulations is not confined to the Free World. Our competitor must also consider this problem. And we have reason to believe that he is working hard on his own defense against our ballistic missiles.

There would appear to be, at the present time, a delicate balance between offensive forces. Our competitor has bombers, so have we. He has offensive ballistic missiles, and so have we.

But what happens to this balance when one side acquires a reliable defense against ballistic missiles? It is my view that he who first develops and deploys such a reliable defense would gain important military and psychological advantages. How our competitor would use these advantages is anybody's guess, but his record constrains me to say that he recognizes the close relationship between military, diplomatic, economic and propaganda factors. And he would certainly like to see us out of business.


We in ARADCOM have already sent some of our best people to White Sands to form the nucleus of a future training and test unit, and a portion of this group will proceed to Kwajalein in the near future. We have devised plans for deployment and have secured NORAD's approval. We have confidence in Zeus based on our knowledge of the system and its developers, and we have confidence in ourselves based on a reservoir of dedicated and experienced air defense personnel. In the lifetime of the AUSA, ARADCOM has deployed guns onto sites and has removed them; has deployed the world's first air defense missile, the Nike Ajax on-site and has partially removed it; and has deployed the second generation Nike Hercules on more than 100 sites and has adjusted to major improvements in it.

Now I assure you that you don't develop reliable fire units merely by marrying school-trained personnel to reliable equipments and placing them in on-site honeymoon cottages. Some of the lessons came hard; there were many growing pains, there were many and far reaching adjustments and accommodations.

Nor could we have accomplished the mission of providing trained Army air defense units except for the substantial help given to us by other elements of the Army. We have been supported to the utmost by CONARC and the ZI armies directly, and through their agencies, particularly the Army Air Defense Center and School. The technical services have taken extraordinary measures to keep our equipment operating, night and day, and Department of the Army staff has given us unfailing support.

Nor could we have accomplished our mission without the understanding and support given to us by our neighbors in the hundreds of communities where we live.

And so, I close this report by saying, on behalf of the men and women of ARADCOM, I thank all who are assisting with our mission. I ask for your confidence of our capabilities to cope with a ruthless and unprincipled competitor who has sworn to destroy us.



## TAMING THE WILD BLUE YONDER

Primary responsibility for research, development, production, testing and evaluation of the Air Force's newest weapons systems—this is the mission of the recently created Air Force Systems Command. To its men—our defense architects—this mission presents the eternal challenge . . . that of taming the wild blue yonder.

# AFSC

In pursuit of this challenge AFSC must call upon the vast resources of industry and of education, as well as those of the military. AC Spark Plug is being called upon to develop and produce the small, yet highly accurate inertial guidance system for the TITAN II. This is but one example of American industry and government working together so peoples of the world may live together—in peace.

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ACchiever inertial guidance systems for Titan II, Thor and  
Mace. Bombing navigation systems for the B-52 and B-47.

# 1961 RESOLUTIONS

*Adopted 8 September 1961 by the Assembled Delegates*

## The World Looks to the United States

The Association of the United States Army holds that events of the past year have fully justified the belief it has long held that the free and unaligned nations of the earth are engaged in a total struggle with the totalitarian forces of the Sino-Soviet world.

The Association of the United States Army recognizes that this struggle against the free world, begun more than four decades ago, has as its goal the domination of the entire globe.

The Association of the United States Army holds that now is the time when the great power of the United States must be turned fearlessly against these communist conspiratorial forces. Not only must our military power be brought to bear, but also it must support all agencies of our society to counter communist aggression in the economic, psychopolitical, propaganda, geopolitical and other arenas of the world-wide protracted conflict now being waged.

Our pledge to Berlin is an undoubted commitment upon which the continued existence of a strong NATO depends and upon which, in turn, the continued existence of our other security arrangements such as SEATO, CENTO and OAS throughout the free world may in large measure depend.

In recent weeks certain actions have been taken to provide us with the military power we must have. But more needs to be done. To thwart and turn back the communist tide, and to defeat it ultimately, the United States must be prepared to meet the enemy whenever and wherever necessary. As a nation we have great nuclear capabilities; we have an increasing non-nuclear capability; and our capacity to face up to the enemy unflaggingly is beyond measuring.

The resolutions that follow are framed to meet the long range military requirements of our nation and to fulfill the moral obligation the Nation itself has to the men and women in uniform and to all its peoples.

*All Resolutions of previous years that have not been attained, implemented or rescinded remain in effect.*

### **NO. 1. STRENGTH OF THE ARMY**

WHEREAS, the communist threat to the U.S. and Free World security is increasingly all-encompassing

and diversified, emphasizing steadily improving military capabilities both for massive nuclear attack on the U.S. and for varied forms of limited aggression, while continuing to exploit cold war vulnerabilities throughout the non-communist world; and

WHEREAS, Army forces are necessary both for U.S. survival and for ultimate success in war; and

WHEREAS, a strong, modern, multi-capable active Army, suitably deployed and backed up by mobile strategic reserves and supplemented by the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, is the backbone of the deterrent to limited communist aggression and a decisive component of the Free World forces required to meet such aggression promptly and to deal with it forcibly; and

WHEREAS, U.S. Army forces deployed overseas, in strategic reserve, and in military assistance activities provide a real and credible deterrent to the low-key violence of cold war, and provide a significant means by which the U.S. can assist its Allies in dealing with communist-inspired and directed disorders; and

WHEREAS, the world-wide communist threat has been intensified during recent months and further pressure may be anticipated simultaneously at widely separated points over our global frontier; and

WHEREAS, the U.S. Army does not yet have sufficient strength to fulfill the multiple responsibilities inherent in its assigned roles and missions and its world-wide commitments;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that there be no ceiling on the number of troops in the Active Army and that the number be determined from time to time by the troop strength necessary to meet the contingencies in Europe and possible multiple simultaneous crises in other areas of the world; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the paid drill strength of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard be maintained at a sufficiently high level to provide trained manpower and units to supplement and support those Active Army units deployed beyond the limits of the United States should necessity arise.

### **NO. 2. MODERNIZATION**

WHEREAS, the USSR has modernized and reequipped its forces since World War II, emphasizing mechaniza-

tion, electronics equipment, and firepower of increased range, lethality, and mobility, and is producing modern ground equipment at a rate greater than that of the U.S., thereby permitting the USSR to equip not only its own forces but also those of its satellites and allies; and

WHEREAS, the U.S. Army plans to reorganize its combat divisions and has adopted new operational concepts, but has not been substantially reequipped with modern weapons and equipment; and

WHEREAS, American scientists and engineers have attained significant technological advances in the evolution of equipment through research and development; and

WHEREAS, it is recognized that Congress has increased significantly the level of funding for materiel modernization; and

WHEREAS, it is the solemn responsibility of our Nation to insure that our forces are provided the best obtainable equipment to deter or deal with all forms of Communist aggression;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the modernization of the U.S. Army be further accelerated, including research, development and procurement of equipment, and the reorganization of combat divisions, in order to provide the U.S. Army with the means to assure U.S. and Allied forces superiority over Communist forces in all weapons and equipment.

#### No. 3. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

WHEREAS, an adequate airlift is vital for the rapid deployment of Army forces; and

WHEREAS, our defense of freedom and liberty may be challenged on several continents simultaneously; and

WHEREAS, our ability to respond promptly is a deterrent; and

WHEREAS, our ability to commit necessary forces if and when required is essential; and

WHEREAS, adequate sealift is likewise essential to supplement and maintain our forces overseas;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that airlift and sealift, strategic and tactical, be assured in proportion to Army strength and operational needs; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that funds and research be applied to the development of modern equipment and techniques to meet these requirements.

#### No. 4. RESERVE FORCES READINESS

WHEREAS, the expanding world-wide communist threat makes clear the need for trained reserve forces in improved states of readiness to complement the active Army; and

WHEREAS, these are extraordinary times demanding sacrifices and cooperation on the part of all Americans;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that actions be taken to improve the combat readiness of units and individuals of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to enable them to meet realistic mobilization schedules; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that additional paid multiple drills be authorized and that the period of Annual Active Duty For Training for selected priority units be expanded to three consecutive weeks; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that home station facilities be realistically expanded and improved and that all authorized organizational and individual equipment be issued; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that these actions be taken with respect not only to combat units but also to supporting forces which can be employed on a priority basis in support of the active Army; and



**The 1961 Resolutions Committee.** Front row, left to right: Richard H. Ayre, Judge Thomas W. Caldecott, Chairman; Dru L. Pippin. Back row, left to right: Robert J. Curtin, John C. Neff, Robert H. Cushing, Walter J. Schuchmann, Thurmond F. Nance, John N. McLaurin, George H. Schafer, Norman Moran, William S. Bigham. Not present: Wayne Wright.

that this Association take all necessary steps needed to publicize and otherwise support these actions.

#### **No. 5. DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES**

WHEREAS, an adequate defense against ballistic missile attack is vital to the Nation's security; and

WHEREAS, there is considerable evidence that the USSR is concentrating on developing an anti-missile system at top speed and with highest military priority; and

WHEREAS, the United States Army has demonstrated a unique capability for developing and deploying in a minimum time and at minimum cost effective, operational land-based air defense systems; and

WHEREAS, the Army has, in an advanced stage of development, the only anti-ballistic missile system in the hardware stage, the NIKE-ZEUS; and

WHEREAS, timely deployment of NIKE-ZEUS depends on early initiation of production of long lead-time components of the system;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that in the interest of national security, the Association of the United States Army urges the commitment of the funds required to insure the immediate production and operational deployment of NIKE-ZEUS.

#### **No. 6. CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE**

WHEREAS, chemical and biological warfare is a probability; and

WHEREAS, there is every evidence that our potential enemy is seriously engaged in research and development of chemical and biological warfare; and

WHEREAS, the relative newness of developments in chemical-biological agents and attendant security restrictions applied to these developments have resulted in considerable misunderstanding by the people of the United States;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army urges an accelerated program of research and development in the field of chemical and biological warfare in both offensive and defensive measures; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that a full-scale program be undertaken to inform all military personnel of the capabilities and nature of chemical-biological warfare and to gain for it public acceptance and understanding.

#### **No. 7. MUTUAL SECURITY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

WHEREAS, national security in this era is dependent in substantial part on the strength of our Allies; and

WHEREAS, the Mutual Security and Military Assistance Programs are vital factors in increasing the strength of our Allies, and thus of our own position; and

WHEREAS, the Mutual Security and Military Assistance Programs are, in effect, our front line in defense of our freedoms and way of life; and

WHEREAS, a wisely and soundly administered pro-

gram will merit the year-in year-out support of the American public;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army fully supports the objectives of the Mutual Security and Military Assistance Programs, urges adequate funds for their support, and endeavors to interpret the need and beneficial results to the people of this nation as a means to achieve full understanding and support for these programs.

#### **No. 8. COLD WAR ACTIVITIES**

WHEREAS, the United States Army has long recognized the value of unconventional warfare; and

WHEREAS, the Army has visualized the collateral peacetime capabilities of the U.S. Army Special Forces and other Army units to assist the armed forces of free nations in countering communist-inspired insurgency and subversion; and

WHEREAS, the increased communist emphasis on this form of aggression has caused the Army to provide a greater capability in this field;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army endorses and supports continuing activities to assist free nations in countering communist-inspired cold war operations.

#### **No. 9. ROTC PROGRAM**

WHEREAS, the ROTC program is the principal source of commissioned officers in both war and peace and provides a broad mobilization base during times of national emergency; and

WHEREAS, the ROTC program is vital to the continuing production of high caliber officers to meet Army requirements; and

WHEREAS, the training conducted in ROTC programs in high schools and universities is essential to our National Defense, and contributes to the fundamental development of leadership, citizenship, and patriotism in young men; and

WHEREAS, various programs designed to increase incentives and improve curricula in the ROTC program are now being studied by the Department of Army;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army recommends that ROTC courses be raised to college level standards, that participation in the program be mandatory during the first two years of attendance at Land Grant Colleges and Universities; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that adequate federal assistance be provided for all Army ROTC programs.

#### **No. 10. CIVIL DEFENSE**

WHEREAS, the President has declared the need for greatly accelerated civil defense activities, including the initiation of a substantial shelter program; and

WHEREAS, civil defense responsibilities have been assigned to the Secretary of Defense; and

WHEREAS, protection of the civilian population requires coordination of effort and resources at federal, state and local levels, both military and civilian;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that adequate resources and priorities be allocated this program for development of policies and plans that will provide clear guidance to responsible civilian and military leaders and volunteers at local levels; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that should the Army be assigned certain civil defense functions, it be furnished increased funds and personnel commensurate with the additional workload.

#### **No. 11. UTILIZATION OF RETIRED PERSONNEL**

WHEREAS, military personnel retired upon completion of twenty years or more of active duty possess a wealth of experience; and

WHEREAS, these personnel are precluded by law from participation in reserve components programs; and

WHEREAS, the national security posture must be maintained at the highest level;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that retired personnel be authorized to participate in the reserve component ready and standby programs.

#### **No. 12. OFF-SITE MILITARY HOUSING FACILITIES**

WHEREAS, military personnel at off-site stations are not in a position to utilize government quarters and

it has been difficult for such personnel to secure suitable housing in certain areas, as has been recognized by law with respect to tactical personnel; and

WHEREAS, there has been severe hardship created by non-tactical personnel being forced to rent housing at a rate far in excess of rental allowances;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army advocates that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force be authorized to lease a suitable number of housing facilities for members of the armed forces at off-site duty stations upon a determination that there is a lack of adequate housing facilities at or near such duty stations.

#### **No. 13. ARMY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER INSIGNIA OF GRADE**

WHEREAS, insignia of grade of a noncommissioned officer is a necessary item of uniform, based on tradition, designating differences in rank, and lending prestige and morale to the wearer; and

WHEREAS, present policy requires that on 30 June 1962 all noncommissioned officers in grade E7 replace traditional insignia with one less stripe;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Association of the United States Army advocates that the deadline date of 30 June 1962 for removal of the third stripe be rescinded and that grade E7 personnel wear the traditional six-stripe insignia.

## **Rusk Speaks at Marshall Dinner Tonight**



*Association of the U.S. Army*

**BOOSTER**



*Published Daily by Aerojet-General Corporation*

• WASHINGTON, D. C.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1961

## **KEY MOMENT OF CRISIS FOR NATION**



Our nation is now at a key moment of crisis and the next 90 days may very well see the test which will decide whether future history will be one of richness and diversity in the world or whether it will be one of bleak conformity to world-wide totalitarianism.

AUSA had a daily newspaper during the three-day annual meeting. Edited and published by the Aerojet-General Corporation it was distributed to delegates and guests each morning.



## ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

### AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its branches and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

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## LETTERS

(Continued from page 9)

port from the view of the rated officer. The inference that I lack the courage of my convictions when before my subordinates does no credit to my supposed standards of integrity. In my experience, the failure of raters to show reports to the rated has promoted an unhealthy atmosphere of distrust and fear throughout a command. Further, how frequently can an officer stationed in Alaska, Ankara or Ashtabula get to the Pentagon? Does the Department of the Army want us to visit each year? Every two years? The counseling system will, in my opinion, be effective only if the rater "shows," "tells," or otherwise "indicates" to the rated officer how he compared him against a known standard of evaluation. In other words, the rater must tell the rated where he stands.

MAJ. PAUL F. BRAIM  
Newark, Del.

### SEARCHLIGHTS IN DEFENSE

• What became of all those million-candlepower antiaircraft searchlights?

The article on Berlin Command in the August issue raises an idea. For what it is worth I suggest the use of high-power searchlights to temporarily blind and disorganize hostile mobs. It seems likely that such a light beam directed in the faces of a mob, day or night, would be effective for a considerable period after it passed, while persons exposed to it were trying to readjust their eyes.

There might even be some value, in certain circumstances, against enemy troops advancing against a position.

Does anyone know whether this has been tried?


Could exposure to such a light beam cause permanent eye injury? If so, precautions would be necessary where friendly troops might become exposed.

I have heard of one instance where a searchlight was used effectively to disperse looters and skulkers after a major calamity in a city. It seems to me the method should be explored for military use.

Congratulations on the high quality of your magazine. More articles by Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall and more accounts in detail of small-unit battles would be especially welcomed by one who has been a constant subscriber to ARMY and its predecessor, *Field Artillery Journal*, since 1917.

COL. J. H. HARWOOD  
East Greenwich, R. I.

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## Your leadership counts when it's time to listen

When you listen more than you talk—you learn more. That's why a good leader encourages suggestions—builds initiative by showing confidence in his men's ability to contribute. So when you have an opportunity to listen, take advantage of it. Many excellent ideas never see daylight unless you check with the

man closest to the job. *Giving a courteous hearing to suggestions* is one secret of successful leadership—one proven way of motivating the men under you to do their best. And since a leader is judged by the morale and performance of his men... **you have a personal stake in leadership**

